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ABSTRACT 
This thesis applies net assessment to the Colombian Government’s protracted campaign 
against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in order to determine 
proper metrics to track progress in counterinsurgency warfare. Net assessment is used to 
analyze potential centers of gravity to determine the correct center of gravity. Armed with 
the correct center of gravity, potential critical vulnerabilities are examined. Finally, once 
the correct critical vulnerability is identified, metrics are assessed, in order to determine 
which metrics accurately track progress in attacking the identified center of gravity. 
As debate exists as to the true nature of the FARC, this thesis applies the above 
methodology to the FARC as both an ideological insurgent group and a narco-criminal 
organization, and identifies different centers of gravity, critical vulnerabilities and metrics 
in each case. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This thesis applies net assessment to the Colombian Government’s protracted campaign 
against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) in 
order to determine proper metrics to track progress in counterinsurgency warfare. This 
thesis applies the above methodology to the FARC-EP as both an ideological insurgent 
group and a narco-criminal organization, using the FARC-EP to provide two distinct case 
studies. 
In each case study, potential centers of gravity are examined, and one is identified 
as the true center of gravity. Next, the center of gravity is assessed for critical 
vulnerabilities, and one critical vulnerability is selected. Finally, net assessment is used to 
determine which metrics offer an accurate indication of progress, and which metrics are 
misleading or independent of the desired results. 
In the case of the FARC-EP as an ideological group, potential centers of gravity 
are leadership, alliances and popular support. Leadership is eliminated as a center of 
gravity after reviewing the success the Colombian Government has had in eliminating 
FARC-EP leadership, with little noticeable impact. Indeed, the greatest impact was 
following the death of Jacobo Arenas, of natural causes. His death opened the way for 
greater FARC-EP involvement in the narcotics trade, strengthening them in some 
regards, especially financial. Next, alliances were ruled out, as the FARC-EP has 
received little outside support, has weathered the collapse of the Soviet Union, and has 
outlasted potential domestic allies, with little loss of strength. Finally, popular opinion is 
determined to be the FARC-EP’s center of gravity. Popular opinion includes both 
genuine support by Colombians who agree with FARC-EP’s goals or benefit from the 
insurgents, such as coca cultivators who receive protection, as well as coerced support 
from civilians who may prefer the Colombian Government to the insurgents, but will not 
act on their preference due to fear of guerrilla retribution. 
If the FARC-EP’s center of gravity is popular support, then territorial control is its 
critical vulnerability. It needs to exercise territorial control to maintain both consensual 
 xii 
and coerced popular support. Territorial control does not indicate trench lines or clearly 
defined sectors on a map, but rather the ability for one side to exert its will while 
simultaneously denying its opponent the ability to do so. This suggests several metrics, 
such as body counts, that offer a dubious picture of the conflict. Rather, the willingness of 
the campesinos to work with the Colombian Government and not with the FARC-EP 
should be measured, using metrics, such as intelligence tips received and low-level 
FARC-EP defections. Additionally, the degree to which the government has territorial 
control can be judged by the nature of its presence—neighborhood police foot patrols 
indicating a high level of government control, heavily armored mechanized convoys 
indicating a strong guerilla presence. 
Assessing the FARC-EP as a narco-criminal organization offers different possible 
centers of gravity, including drug production, drug distribution, money laundering, and 
personnel. Net assessment demonstrates that production, specifically the production of 
coca leaves, is the center of gravity of the FARC-EP as a criminal organization. 
Examining coca production offers two possible critical vulnerabilities, crop eradication 
and crop substitution. For a number of reasons, crop eradication has been the preferred 
method, as measured by resources committed and press releases issued. However, 
eradication is ineffective and often counterproductive; as campesinos see their livelihoods 
destroyed by the government, and are consequently driven to illegal organizations for 
protection. Crop substitution thus appears to be the correct critical vulnerability, but in 
fact the desired end state is to offer better economic alternatives to coca cultivation, 
whether that is legal crops, factory work, or any other form of legal employment. This 
suggests economic development as the path to reduce the cocaine production of 
Colombia, and metrics to track economic development as the long term solution. In the 





Net assessment applied to the FARC-EP reveals that they remain an ideological 
movement despite their increased narcotics activities. Further, net assessment shows that 
the Colombian Government, with American assistance, has made great strides in 
combating the FARC-EP. Colombian military pressure has forced the insurgents to the 
peace table; the Colombian Government must use net assessment to finish demobilizing 
the FARC-EP and achieve a lasting peace. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. WHAT IS NET ASSESSMENT?  
While net assessment may appear to be a relatively new term dating from the 
1980s, the concept is as ancient as war itself. At its most basic, net assessment is a 
calculation of strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats that guides analysis of 
the assessor’s national forces and those of a perceived rival nation. The classical Chinese 
scholar Sun Tzu, in his study The Art of War, recognized the importance of net 
assessment: “Therefore, appraise it [war] in terms of the five fundamental factors … so 
you may assess its essentials.”1 Marcus Porcius Cato, Cato the Elder, famously ended his 
speeches with the phrase “Moreover, I advise that Carthage should be destroyed” as he 
net assessed that Carthage’s economic resources would in time allow it to conquer Rome, 
and so suggested a political goal—the destruction of Carthage—to keep that from 
happening.2 The strategy—creating an army and a fleet and maneuvering it to North 
Africa to defeat Carthaginian forces—took some generations to accomplish. In similar 
fashion, United States (U.S.) Navy planners during the 1930s assessed their fleet superior 
to the Japanese fleet on the basis of merely counting hulls, without regards to factors, 
such as training, doctrine, technology, but most importantly, the potential interaction 
between the two fleets.3 
Proper net assessment focuses on the potential interaction of two opposing forces 
in the form of opportunities and threats, not merely on the strengths and weaknesses of 
the forces individually. In the case of the U.S. Navy’s assessment prior to World War II, 
simple numbers appeared to give the advantage to the Americans. Not only did the 
Washington and London Naval Treaties give the Americans a 5:3 advantage in capital 
ship and cruiser tonnage, but also, American planners believed that many U.S. warships 
                                                 
1 The five fundamentals according to Sun Tzu are moral influence, weather, terrain, command, and 
doctrine. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. and trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1963), 63. 
2 Richard Miles, Carthage Must Be Destroyed: The Rise and Fall of an Ancient Civilization (New 
York: Penguin Books, 2010), 12. 
3 Stephen Peter Rosen, “Net Assessment as an Analytical Concept,” in On Not Confusing Ourselves 
eds. Andrew W. Marshall, J. J. Martin, and Henry S. Rowen (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 288. 
2 
were superior to their Japanese counterparts. The Americans argued that because daytime 
surface actions would be the norm, battles would be decided by long-range gunnery. This 
caused American planners to ignore or underrate the Japanese Long Lance torpedo and 
their corresponding night combat doctrine. After suffering heavy losses in at Guadalcanal 
from 1942–1943 to Japanese night torpedo attacks, U.S. Navy surface planners saw the 
rapid-fire 8-inch gun, still optimized for daytime combat at extreme ranges, as the 
answer.4 In theory, the firepower packed by American heavy cruisers and the weight of 
iron they could throw was impressive. In reality, short-range night combat was more 
common off Guadalcanal, and the Japanese torpedoes offered them a critical tactical 
advantage.5 Incorrect net assessment proved costly to the U.S. Navy. 
Net assessment in the form of reassessment does not end when the shooting starts, 
but rather as the Guadalcanal example illustrates, it is vital during hostilities, as it dictates 
whether existing operational and tactical approaches are contributing to the success of the 
strategy or if they must be adjusted, and on which level—tactical, operational, strategic or 
in the contours of policy. The British used strategic assessment during the First World 
War to measure their progress in the First Battle of the Atlantic, and drastically changed 
strategies as a result of this assessment.6 At the beginning of the war, naval doctrine 
envisaged the use of submarines as part of main fleet action. Acting as a screen in the 
vanguard of fleets, they would attrite opposing warships, thereby reducing the firepower 
of enemy fleets in advance of main fleet actions. However, main fleet actions were rare in 
the North Atlantic, and submarines too slow to maneuver effectively in advance of more 
rapid surface ships, so that the British were able to secure their major warships at Scapa 
Flow, an anchorage protected from U-boat attack. Denied warship targets, the U-boats 
commenced commerce warfare against British shipping. At first, they operated in 
accordance with prize rules, but the emergence of armed merchant vessels in the form of 
Q-ships made it too dangerous for U-boats to surface and take prizes. Unrestricted 
                                                 
4 James D. Hornfischer, Neptune’s Inferno: The U.S. Navy at Guadalcanal (New York: Bantam 
Books, 2011), 392. 
5 Norman Friedman, U.S. Cruisers: An Illustrated Design History (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press, 1984), 324. 
6 Scott Sigmund Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997), 
63. 
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submarine warfare, the sinking of merchant ships without warning, ensued from February 
to August 1915, when American pressure forced the Germans to cease least they draw the 
United States into the war. 
By 1917, the German General Staff, under pressure to win the war in advance of 
U.S. intervention, and criticized because Britain’s naval blockade allegedly had brought 
the German population to the brink of starvation, concluded that they could knock Britain 
out of the war with an unrestricted campaign of U-boat warfare. Launched in January 
1917, the U-boat campaign initially caught the Royal Navy unprepared. British shipping 
losses mounted rapidly, reaching 540,000 tons in February 1917, compared to 368,000 
tons the previous month. As the legend goes, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George 
then overruled his Admiralty and instituted a convoy system, a counter to maritime 
raiding practiced at least as old as the Roman Empire, instantly turning the tide of the 
Battle of the Atlantic. In fact, losses continued to rise, setting a new monthly record in 
March 1917 at 593,841 tons, before peaking at 881,027 tons in April 1917. After April, 
shipping losses started to decrease, but remained above 1916 levels until September 
1918.7 
At first glance, raw monthly loss tonnage between March and September 1917 
would suggest that the convoy system was a failure. The British lost more merchant ships 
in the 18 months after instituting the convoy system, 6,463,102 tons, than they did in the 
previous 18 months, 4,986,905. Using such one-dimensional analysis, however, misses 
the concept of net assessment, which is to take all variables into account to create an 
overall interpretation of the situation. Prior to the implementation of the convoy system, 
shipping losses were increasing. Once convoys were in place, total losses remained high 
for several months, but the rate of increase slowed, and then began to decrease. A 
positive trend in the correct metric indicated that the convoy tactics was effectively 
countering the German strategy to knock Britain out of the war by denying it maritime 
resupply and to prevent U.S. intervention by blocking Atlantic access.8 
                                                 
7 Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War, 77–78. 
8 Ibid., 82–83. 
4 
Net assessment is only effective if the correct metric is utilized. While the British 
civilian leaders viewed merchant tonnage lost as the most important factor, the Admiralty 
reached a very different conclusion. To the Royal Navy, the problem was that U-Boats 
were sinking merchant ships, so the solution was to sink U-Boats. At first, they 
approached this by dispatching hunter-killer groups of surface warships, and opposed 
convoys, as did the commercial shipping industry, as being too passive, slow, and 
expensive. Later, the Admiralty realized that convoys are actually tactically offensive in 
nature, as they forced U-boats to enter weapons range of the convoy’s escorts. However, 
their ultimate support for convoys was an example of reaching the correct solution for the 
wrong reason. The Royal Navy continued to track U-boats destroyed, rather than ships 
successfully reaching harbor, as the primary metric. What ultimately mattered was how 
much tonnage reached Britain, and tonnage lost is useful because, not only does it impact 
current shipments, but it impacts future numbers as well, by reducing the overall size of 
the British Merchant Marine. Increased U-boat losses indicated not only improved Royal 
Navy anti-submarine tactics, but also an overall increase in the number of U-boats 
operating in the Atlantic. Tracking U-boat losses was meant to measure U-boat strength. 
Even had that been an interesting metric, it did not take into account German construction 
programs. Lloyd George was correct to track merchant losses, and specifically the rate of 
increase or decrease, as it more accurately reflected the Royal Navy’s operational and 
tactical effectiveness in the U-boat war, as well as the failure of German strategy to seal 
off the Atlantic, eliminate or diminish Anglo-American military power, and hence isolate 
France.9 
The British experience in the Atlantic during World War I has interesting parallels 
with counter-insurgency warfare. The Guerre de course, or commerce warfare, especially 
as practiced by early submarines, resembles guerilla warfare in many of its essential 
tactics. The submarine used stealth to defeat better-armed surface warships, and preferred 
to attack lightly armed merchant ships, as the guerrilla ambushes government troops and 
only attacks weaker forces. The Admiralty’s use of U-boat sinkings as a metric is 
comparable to the body-count metric sometimes used in counter-insurgencies, and both 
                                                 
9 Gartner, Strategic Assessment in War, 79–80, 85–87. 
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share the inherent problems of accurately measuring casualties inflicted on a force one 
cannot see. The same net assessment process that helped the British fight a World War 
can be used in counter-insurgency. 
B. DEFINITIONS 
This section will explain terms found throughout this thesis. 
1. Victory 
Victory in counter-insurgency almost certainly does not mean a World War II 
style surrender ceremony onboard the USS Missouri. Defeated insurgencies do not 
necessarily end, but rather, may fade away. Once it becomes clear that the insurgents are 
losing, many lukewarm supporters abandon the cause. Hardcore insurgents may not or 
cannot surrender, for reasons of ideology or fear of punishment. The Malayan Emergency 
offers an example of an “Emergency” officially declared over in 1960. Yet the 
Communist Party of Malaya leadership remained hiding in the jungles of Thailand until 
1989.10 Using this example, victory in counter-insurgency may be said to occur when the 
insurgents are contained and no long pose an existential threat to the state. 
2. Center of Gravity 
Clausewitz defines a center of gravity as “the source of all power and movement 
upon which everything depends.”11 Joint Publication 1–02, Department of Defense 
Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, draws on Clausewitz to define “center of 
gravity” as: 
The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of 
action, or will to act.12 
                                                 
10 R. W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organization of a Successful 
Counterinsurgency Effort (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1972), 20–21. 
11 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), 595. 
12 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and 
Associated Terms, April 2006, 44. 
6 
A more concise rephrasing of this is “a system’s source of power to act.”13 
Debate over what constitutes a center of gravity lies at the heart of strategy making. This 
thesis will use Clausewitz’s definition of a center of gravity. 
3. Critical Vulnerability 
Joint Publication 1–02 defines “critical vulnerability” as: 
An aspect of a critical requirement which is deficient or vulnerable to 
direct or indirect attack that will create decisive or significant effects.14 
From this definition, critical vulnerabilities are elements, like economic resources, 
personnel, and logistics, whose degradation will significantly impact an organization’s 
ability to fight. The benefit of destroying either a physical or intangible aspect of an 
organization must be weighed against the effort expended.  
4. Insurgency 
Joint Publication 1–02 defines “insurgency” as: 
The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement 
that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. 
Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.15 
Insurgency is therefore a strategic process, one that combines all elements of 
struggle including political and economic. Guerrilla warfare, sometimes called partisan 
warfare, is an operational or tactical process carried out by irregular, usually but not 
exclusively indigenous, forces that relies on concealment, ambush, surprise, and even 
terror tactics to fight at an advantage against a conventionally superior armed force. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
Some may argue that net assessment is more difficult in counter-insurgency than 
in conventional warfare. Whereas progress in conventional warfare can be measured by 
tracking the territory and objectives seized, only in the final stages of a successful 
                                                 
13 Dale C. Eikmier, “Centers of Gravity Analysis,” Military Review 84, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 2. 
14 Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, 81. 
15 Ibid., 161. 
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insurgency might a guerilla army attempt to take a country’s capital, for instance. On the 
other hand, progress in any war of attrition—conventional or insurgent—is difficult to 
assess. To take World War I as an example, peripheral objectives and secondary allies 
came and went, and were interpreted as predictors of ultimate success or failure. But the 
outcome of the war depended ultimately on the popular and soldierly morale, economic 
staying power, and political will of the major adversaries, all notoriously difficult to 
assess. This did not become apparent until the final collapse of German morale and hence 
political will to fight in the summer of 1918. In order to assess progress against an 
insurgent movement with any degree of accuracy, a net assessment must be conducted 
early and often. As a guide to net assessment, it may be tempting to draw linear parallels 
between conflicts as that allow operational and tactical methods that proved successful in 
the past to be reapplied elsewhere. However, no two cases are alike. American doctrine in 
Vietnam was influenced by previous experience in Greece and Korea, with less 
successful results.16 
While each insurgency must be treated as a unique case, the net assessment that 
must be conducted follows a set process. Such an assessment must first determine the 
nature of the insurgency, as that will dictate its centers of gravity. An insurgency may 
have a rural or urban focus, or it may enjoy broad popular support or have a limited 
vanguard elite, or it may draw support from a specific ethnic or religious faction. Since a 
center of gravity is something that if destroyed will lead to the defeat of the insurgency, 
the challenge of net assessment is to figure out the nature of the insurgency, as this will 
dictate the strategy. For its part, the insurgency may obfuscate its true nature, to confuse 
or distort the net assessment and hence misdirect the counter-insurgent. Ideally, further 
analysis will narrow down possible choices and reveal the one true center of gravity. 
Clausewitz links the center of gravity to the character of the adversary: 
For Alexander, Gustavus Adolphus, Charles XII, and Fredrick the Great, 
the center of gravity was their army. If their army had been destroyed, 
they would have gone down in history as failures. In countries subject to 
                                                 
16 Larry E. Cable, Conflict of Myths (New York: New York University, 1986), 141. (Questions 
surrounding the veracity of Dr. Cable military record and personal history do not invalidate the quality of 
his scholarly writings. Conflict of Myths has received numerous positive scholastic reviews despite the 
possible shortcomings of its author.)  
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domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small 
countries that rely on large ones, it is usually the army of their protector. 
Among alliances, it lies in the community of interests, and in popular 
uprisings it is in the personalities of the leaders and public opinion.17 
Clausewitz’s assessment may not prove true in all insurgencies, yet it proves a useful 
starting point in determining the center of gravity for a given case. 
The net assessment must then analyze critical vulnerabilities. Factors to be 
considered when determining critical vulnerabilities include the ability to locate relevant 
targets and then neutralize them, the impact of its loss on the insurgent, the insurgent’s 
ability to replace losses, and the total number of targets to be neutralized in that category. 
While an insurgency may have two hundred fronts and only one charismatic leader, it 
may be easier to locate the fronts than one well-hidden individual. It may seem quicker to 
conduct search and destroy sweeps through the jungle than conduct long-term civil affair 
programs. However, which course of action offers a better return on investment? Having 
determined the correct center of gravity, the relevant critical vulnerabilities must be 
attacked. 
Once the correct critical vulnerabilities have been identified, the proper metrics 
must be applied. What is to be measured is the impact on the center of gravity. Metrics 
must be reliably measured, they must be assessed in context, they must be viewed over a 
period of time, and they must address the desired end result, not some intermediate 
factor. U-boat losses were the wrong metric as the objective was getting supplies to 
Britain, not reducing the size of Germany’s submarine fleet. Furthermore, accurately 
measuring U-boats destroyed was problematic, as a standard submarine tactic was to 
simulate destruction by releasing oil and debris, or submarines often sank with all hands, 
leaving little evidence of their demise—so naval officers might count the U-boats that 
escaped through subterfuge as kills, while those destroyed might pass unnoticed. 
Additionally, the number of U-boats sunk was largely dependent on the level of U-boat 
activity, and increasing sinkings could be a result of increased U-Boat presence, not more 
effective strategies. Clausewitz’s “friction” is always a factor, and random chance can 
result in false indices in the short term. One attack or accident may double the monthly 
                                                 
17 Clausewitz, On War, 596. 
9 
casualty figure, but that does not indicate the need for a tactical or operational adjustment 
so long as the strategy is robust. Finally, there is the “Battle of the Bulge” syndrome, in 
which a desperate last grasp at victory may wrongly be interpreted as a sign of enemy 
strength.18 Net assessment must be constant, but assessors must take a long-term 
approach to interpreting data. Trends are often more important than raw data. If an 
unfavorable metric is decreasing, even if it remains high, then the current strategy is 
probably effective. 
D. APPLICATION 
This thesis will apply the above methodology to the Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia-People’s Army (FARC-EP) to demonstrate the application of net 
assessment. While the conclusions will be unique to Colombia, the process is applicable 
to any insurgency, or even to conventional military conflicts. This process will be split 
into two chapters, based on the differing interpretations of the nature of the FARC-EP as 
alternatively an ideologically inspired insurgency or a narco-terrorist cartel. Since the 
FARC-EP has elements of both, the Colombian government must devise strategies that 
address both aspects. If the government identifies the FARC-EP as only one of the above 
categorizations, then defeating the FARC-EP may merely attack that aspect and leave its 
other dimension intact. Alternatively, the same strategy may be effective to defeat both 
aspects, but a net assessment must be conducted to determine the correct course of action. 
The two aspects cannot be completely separated, as drugs and other illicit activities fund 
the FARC-EP’ campaign of subversion and so furthers their ideological/political goals. 
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II. THE FARC-EP AS AN IDEOLOGICAL INSURGENCY 
A. BACKGROUND 
Colombia has a long history of civil war and internecine violence dating back to 
the Spanish conquest in the early 1500s. There were numerous failed rebellions against 
Spanish rule until 1819, when Simón Bolívar succeeded in winning independence for the 
Republic of Grand Colombia, consisting of modern day Colombia, Ecuador, Panama, and 
Venezuela. Internal conflicts continued, leading to the secession of Ecuador and 
Venezuela in 1830, but this did not stop the violence. Encouraged by weak central 
authority, rich landowners in Panama declared independence in 1903, and were 
immediately supported by the United States. After this spate of violence, known as the 
War of a Thousand Days, Colombia was relatively peaceful until 1946. 
The triumph of a minority Conservative President in 1946, followed by the 
assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in April 1948, plunged Colombia into renewed civil 
war. Gaitán was a populist politician who had campaigned for land reform, as well as 
other social programs, such as health, education, and housing and denounced the 
oligarchs who he claimed were dominating Colombian politics and economy for personal 
gain. It is widely accepted that Gaitán was set to win the 1950 presidential elections, a 
concept that displeased rivals on both ends of the political spectrum. Conservatives were 
naturally hostile to his proposed social reforms. However, the Colombian Communist 
Party (PCC) opposed him as well, fearing that Gaitán’s incremental reforms would 
satisfy many potential revolutionaries, and forestall a communist uprising. 
Gaitán’s assassin, Juan Roa Sierra, was immediately killed by an enraged mob, 
leaving fertile ground for conspiracy theories claiming that groups ranging from the PCC 
to the CIA were responsible.19 What is clear is that Gaitán’s assassination intensified a 
nascent civil war that became known as “La Violencia,” a decade of carnage that resulted 
in 180,000 to 300,000 deaths. While most insurgents were liberals, the PCC organized 
self-defense militias and guerilla units around Sumapaz, known as “independent 
                                                 
19 Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, Columbia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), 348. 
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republics.” In 1958, the National Front, a political arrangement between the Conservative 
and Liberal parties, came to power, under a power sharing agreement in which the 
Presidency would alternate between the two parties every four years. Other governmental 
positions were equally split, and limited social reforms initiated. This effectively ended 
the worst phase of “la Violencia.” However, isolated groups of diehard liberal “bandits” 
and the Communist “independent republics” held out into the 1960s. 
By 1964, the National Front government was ready to move against the 
Communist enclaves, and ordered the Colombian Army (ENC) to dismantle the 
communes. While the “Laso Plan,” reminiscent of American search and destroy missions 
in Vietnam, was successful in disrupting the “independent republics,” many of its 
supporters were scattered, not killed.20 Under the leadership of Manuel Marulanda Vélez 
(the nom de guerre of Pedro Antonio Marin) and Jacobo Arenas (Luis Morantes), the 
survivors formed the Southern Bloc, which was then renamed the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 1964. For the next two decades, the FARC carried out 
hit-and-run guerrilla raids against isolated police and military forces. Despite their 
grandiose statements about “Bolivarian”21 revolution, they were unable to challenge the 
state directly and remained merely a nuisance to the Colombian government.22 
The Seventh Guerrilla Conference in 1982 proved a turning point for the FARC. 
Adding the initials EP, for People’s Army (Ejército del Pueblo) symbolized the desire to 
turn the FARC into an organized military force capable of supplanting the Colombian 
government and establishing a people’s republic. Rank badges, uniforms and published 
regulations are indicative of the FARC-EP’s attempt to posture itself as a legitimate 
belligerent under the 1949 Geneva Conventions. This grasp for legitimacy was furthered 
by the 1984 La Uribe cease-fire arranged with then Colombian President Belisario 
Betancur. The FARC-EP kept its weapons during the three-year La Uribe truce. 
However, more importantly, the peace talks brought the insurgents a publicity bonanza. 
                                                 
20 Safford, Columbia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society, 356. 
21 Bolivarian Revolution is best described as Communism adapted to post-Cold War Latin America. 
As practiced by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, it claims to e democratic socialism, mixing populist 
and authoritarian rule to achieve economic and social equality. Harold A. Trinkunas, “Defining 
Venezuela’s “Bolivarian Revolution,”” Military Review 85, no. 4 (July/August 2005): 39. 
22 Geoff Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History (London: SAQI, 2004), 42–43. 
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The FARC-EP was able to reach a much wider public base, and recruitment dramatically 
increased. Three years of relative peace also proved the breathing room the FARC-EP 
needed to organize into an effective military force. 
Bolstered by thousands of new recruits, the FARC-EP shifted its tactics towards 
larger engagements, with multiple “fronts,” each consisting of several hundred fighters, 
converging on a target. At the same time the Colombian government’s success against the 
Medellin and Cali cartels created an opportunity for the FARC-EP to expand its 
involvement in the drug trade. Following the death of anti-drug ideologue Jacobo Arenas 
in 1990, the FARC-EP became a major trafficker of cocaine. This in turn financed the 
FARC-EP’s expansion. By the mid-1990s, the FARC-EP had reached its zenith, engaging 
ENC forces in conventional battles, and turning large parts of Colombia into “no-go” 
areas for the government, whose control over the countryside was weak in any case. 
In 1996, the FARC-EP overran the Las Delicias military base, killing 54 and 
capturing 60 ENC troops. This was but the first of a series of large-scale attacks over the 
next two years. The ENC was forced to consolidate it units dispersed throughout the 
countryside, surrendering by some accounts 40 to 60 percent of the territory of Colombia 
to the insurgents, although much of the area surrendered was sparsely populated.23 In 
1998, newly elected President Andrés Pastrana Arango formally surrendered the Despeje, 
(cleared zone), 16,216 square miles of territory, to the guerillas as a prelude to 
negotiation. The FARC-EP took advantage of the Despeje to create a cocaine-producing 
mini-state, as well as launch attacks into the rest of Colombia. This expansion of the 
insurgency demonstrated the FARC-EP still desired to supplant the Colombian 
government and hence had a political goal.24 The Despeje provided ample territory to 




                                                 
23 Simons, Colombia: A Brutal History, 114, 181. 
24 Paul E. Saskiewicz, “The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP): 
Marxist Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005), 
101–102. 
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money, the FARC-EP should have quietly dominated the Despeje without provoking the 
Colombian government into further combat.25 Instead, the FARC-EP continued their 
offensive, triggering Plan Colombia.26 
With increased U.S. military assistance, the ENC regrouped and reversed many of 
the gains made by the FARC-EP in the 1990s. Plan Patriota is the government’s strategy 
to regain control of FARC-EP dominated territory, and it has enjoyed much success. The 
ENC has tried to avoid falling into a body-count mentality, not always with success. 
Rather, Plan Patriota looked to shift the psychological balance away from the FARC-EP 
and towards the government. Some metrics, such as percentage of contacts initiated by 
the FARC-EP vice the ENC may be cited, but overall, the better measure of success is the 
derailing of the FARC-EPs plans to control progressively more territory, and their 
withdrawal into traditional remote strongholds.27 The FARC-EP realized that to win, it 
must prove to the Colombian population that it can supplant the government in Bogotá. 
Its actions in continuing the war despite being granted the Despeje demonstrated that the 
FARC-EP was not satisfied with partial control or a negotiated settlement, but desired to 
take over Colombia. Having demonstrated that the FARC-EP was not serious about 
talking peace, Pastrana and his successor as president from 2002, Álvaro Uribe, were able 
both to rally the population behind a military solution to the conflict and call on the 
United States to finance a military-police offensive with significant aid as part of Plan 
Colombia, and its Colombian manifestation Plan Patriota. The strategic dilemma this 
posed for the FARC was that political power cannot be seized by hiding out in the jungle, 
ambushing the occasional ENC patrol.28 
                                                 
25 Dario E. Teicher, “The Colombian War and the Narco-Terrorist Threat,” in The Homeland Security 
Papers: Stemming the Tide of Terror, ed. M. W. Ritz, R. G. Hensley, Jr. and J. C. Whitmire (Maxwell 
AFB, FL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, 2004), 2, 14. 
26 In 1999, President Pastrana, facing an increasingly powerful FARC-EP, proposed Plan Colombia as 
a “Marshall Plan for Colombia.” His original goal was economic and social development and security 
improvements, while the United States originally focused on reducing the supply of cocaine from 
Colombia. Both countries have modified their views to include combating Colombian paramilitary 
organizations, both right and left wing. U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Plan 
Colombia: A Progress Report by Connie Veillette, CRS Report RL32774, Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, January 11, 2006, 2–3. 
27 Gabriel Pinilla, “Are We Approaching the Real Defeat of the FARC in Colombia?” paper, U.S. 
Army War College, 2009, 11–13. 
28 In 2005, the FARC-EP implemented its Plan Resistencia as a counter to Plan Patriota. Plan 
Resistencia calls for the insurgents to “bend like the reed in the wind,” and survive to fight another day. 
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While denouncing Plan Patriota as evidence that the Colombian government is in 
the thrall of Yankee capitalism, the FARC-EP leadership has effectively acknowledged 
its success by suspending large-scale operations and retreating into the jungle. This return 
to small unit guerrilla warfare is clearly a setback to the FARC-EP, and even as it 
announced Plan Resistencia, it continued to attempt large-scale operations, including a 
December 2005 attack believed to involve 500 insurgents. However, it is highly unlikely 
that the FARC-EP can regain the political and military momentum it enjoyed in the late 
1990s. If the FARC-EP loses sufficient prestige, it will be unable to control territory by 
fear, denying it funds and recruits, and leading to its ultimate defeat. A few hardcore true 
believers may remain deep in the jungle, but without thousands of armed soldiers and the 
drug money they command, FARC-EP would cease to be a political or military threat to 
democratic government in Colombia. 
Much has been written about the FARC-EP’s imminent defeat in the past few 
years. Plan Colombia and Plan Patriota have certainly forced a dramatic change in the 
long Colombian civil war. The FARC-EP was forced to revert to stage one-guerilla 
operations, and the Colombian government is quick to tout metrics to prove their success. 
Assassinations of mayors are down 67% from 2002 to 2009, and roadblock kidnappings 
have been completely eradicated.29 These are promising metrics, yet the FARC-EP is far 
from finished. In order to maximize this strategic success and prevent a FARC-EP 
resurgence, it is vital that the Colombian government continually carry out net 
assessments, and by doing so determine the correct metrics to track progress.  
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Centers of Gravity 
As suggested above, Clausewitz believed that the center of gravity of a 
revolutionary insurgency lay with “the personalities of the leaders and public opinion.”30 
To extend the Clausewitzian analysis further, insurgencies may also be seen as alliances, 
either internal ones of various ideological, possibly tribal/racial groups, or external in so 
                                                 
29 David E. Spencer et al., Colombia’s Road to Recovery: Security and Governance 1982–2010 
(National Defense University, 2011), 67. 
30 Clausewitz, On War, 595. 
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far as an insurgency may depend on foreign support for its survival in the form of 
resources or havens safe from attack. In this case, the center of gravity “lies in the 
community of interests.” This section will analyze each possible center of gravity with 
regards to both its importance to the FARC-EP and the potential impact of its destruction 
upon the FARC-EP as a political/military insurgency. 
a. Leadership 
The first center of gravity Clausewitz suggests is leadership. The 
Colombian Government would appear to agree with this, as it has targeted a succession 
of FARC-EP leaders for elimination. However, the very success enjoyed by the 
Colombian Government in killing FARC-EP leaders rules out leadership as the center of 
gravity. The FARC-EP’s structure allows it to absorb losses among senior officers, and it 
has demonstrated repeatedly that it can do so in practice. 
The FARC-EP has a single Commander in Chief, currently Rodrigo 
Londoño Echeverri, “Timochenko.” Timochenko ascended to command following 
Alfonso Cano’s death at the hands of the ENC in 2011. Alfonso Cano succeeded Manuel 
Marulanda, who died of natural causes in 2008, who in turn succeeded Jacobo Arenas, 
the founding commander of the FARC-EP, who also died of natural causes, in 1990. 
Timochenko reportedly took command the day after Cano’s death, a smooth transition.31 
As long as the FARC-EP keeps their Continuity of Operations plan up to date, they 
appear able to replace commanders faster than the ENC can kill them. 
The Commander in Chief is supported by a seven member Secretariat, 
whose members also serve as the commanders of the FARC-EP’s seven geographic 
commands, or blocks. Another 23 senior officers form the 30-man High Command, 
which acts as the FARC-EP’s general staff, setting policy and doctrine. These senior 
officers form a ready pool to replace fallen Secretariat members, who in turn stand ready 
to assume the Commander in Chief position. 
                                                 
31 Jeremy McDermott, “Colombia’s FARC Rebels Choose Hardliner ‘Timochenko’ to Lead,” The 
Christian Science Monitor, November 16, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-
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The FARC-EP has demonstrated resiliency and the ability to replace top 
commanders in the face of multiple ENC successes. The deaths of Jacobo Arenas, 
Manual Maralunda, Alfonso Cano, and several other senior officers have only resulted in 
greater upward mobility for midgrade FARC-EP commanders. Just as the killing of 
Osama Bin Laden had little operational impact on Al Qaeda, killing multiple FARC-EP 
commanders has not led to an apparent collapse of their armed struggle. This is not to say 
that “Terrorist Wack-a-Mole” is useless, as it is hard to quantify the disruption inherent in 
frequently replacing top leaders in any organization. Still, unlike neighboring Peru’s 
Shining Path, the FARC-EP does not appear vulnerable to decapitation. 
b. Public Opinion 
Public opinion in guerrilla warfare is manifested in popular support. Mao 
Tse-tung considered popular support essential for successful guerrilla warfare.32 If the 
FARC-EP is separated from the “sea of peasants,” will they wither away and die? 
Sympathetic civilians provide the guerrillas an information advantage over the state, 
hiding the insurgent from the state, while reporting on the state’s movements. Popular 
support translates into material support, as civilians provide food, shelter, and what little 
money they can spare. Additionally, the guerrilla must recruit, and the more popular his 
movement, the easier it is to find volunteers. Of all these advantages, the anonymity that 
popular support provides is the most important; if the guerrilla cannot hide, he has little 
chance of surviving even the weakest state’s army. Can the FARC-EP be defeated 
through the erosion of its base of support? 
The FARC-EP’s base of support can be divided into two categories—
genuine support among those who benefit from its protection, such as coca farmers, and 
those who support it out of coercion. In many regions, the FARC-EP lacks not only true 
popular support, but even sympathy from the very peasants it purports to defend.33 In 
some areas, the FARC-EP has had a predatory relationship with the people it claims to be 
                                                 
32 Mao Tse-tung, On Revolution and War, ed. Mostafa Rejai (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co, 
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Security,”” Strategic Studies Institute, 2, July 2005, 
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defending, threatening-and delivering-violence to ensure cooperation.34 In other areas, 
the FARC-EP is seen as protection from corrupt government, or even as the only 
government in remote areas neglected by Bogotá. For some coca farmers, FARC-EP 
protection ensures the survival of their crops, and thus their livelihoods. None of this 
means the campesinos necessarily support the FARC-EP’s ideological goals. Instead, 
they have judged it to be in their own self-interest, to support their FARC-EP, either to 
maximize gain or minimize loss. 
Outside of its traditional strongholds and coca cultivating territory, terror 
is critical to the FRAC-EP’s continued existence. It cannot depend on the campesinos to 
hide guerrillas voluntarily, so the FARC-EP must impress upon them the heavy price they 
will pay for collaborating with the government. In order to expand beyond it the areas 
where it has traditionally enjoyed support, it must challenge the Colombian Government 
for control of regions that may prove less welcoming to FARC-EP encroachment. In 
determining the control of these regions, the Colombian peasants’ pure preferences mean 
nothing, whether they actually prefer the FARC-EP or the government is meaningless. 
They may view the Colombian government as the legitimate government, but they will 
not act on that preference unless they have a reasonable assurance that the state can 
protect them from the FARC-EP. Hence, it is their assisted preference, determined by 
which side offers better rewards for loyalty, or harsher penalties for betrayal, that matters. 
The FARC-EP has a natural advantage over the state in this competition, since it 
promises far worse punishments. Representing a democratic state, the ENC is limited in 
the methods it can use to deal with civilians suspected of aiding the FARC-EP, (even 
though “state” retribution may come at the hands of the paramilitaries, which are often 
tolerated by the ENC) while the insurgents are free to torture and murder those would 
betray “the people.”35 Combined with its narcotics profits, the FARC-EP can, in the areas 
that it controls, easily ensure that assisted preference means support for the insurgency. 
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Public opinion is the FARC-EP’s center of gravity. That does not mean 
the campesinos love the guerrillas. Rather, the campesinos assess that their own self-
interest, be it protection, profit, or survival, dictates they support or at least comply with 
the FARC-EP. Countering the FARC-EP’s forced compliance requires a military and 
police solution to provide security in contested regions. Overcoming the perception that 
in some regions, the FARC-EP is a better alternative to corrupt or absentee government 
requires political, as well as legal reform, but still falls within counterinsurgency strategy. 
As long as the cultivation of coca is illegal, those who cultivate coca for their livelihood 
will support any group that provides protection against the government. However, this 
support is driven by rational self-interest—the campesinos assess that the benefit of their 
support outweighs its costs. While the Colombian Government will be hard pressed to 
win active support from coca cultivators, if it can roll back the FARC-EP to the point that 
they can no longer provide protection, the FARC-EP will lose one important source of 
support.  
c. Alliances 
Alliances are Clausewitz’s third possible insurgent center of gravity. They 
can be divided into three subsets: Alliances internal to the group itself, alliances with 
other domestic groups, such as other guerrillas or criminal organizations, and foreign 
alliances, such as nation states or foreign insurgent groups. The FARC-EP has enjoyed 
alliances with all of the above at various times, and the Colombian Government has had 
mixed successes breaking them up. 
The FARC-EP has been able to maintain its own internal alliances and 
avoid fracturing due to its pragmatic ideology. While it has roots in 1960s Marxist-
Leninism, it has adopted a more flexible “Bolivarianism,” combining nationalist and 
socialist ideologies, and de-emphasizes Communist goals. The re-invention allowed the 
FARC-EP to survive the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general repudiation of 
Marxist-Leninism. Instead of focusing on what the FARC-EP hopes to achieve, they have 
focused on the Colombian Government’s failure to efficiently govern, and on promising 
to correct those shortfalls. This allows greater leeway in ideology amongst its members, 
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and has prevented the creation of splinter factions with differing goals. In short, the 
FARC-EP has gone from trying to destroy the state to trying to take over the state.36 
The next level of alliances is those with other internal groups, in this case 
other guerrillas and narco-traffickers. The second largest guerrilla group in Colombia is 
the Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), or the National Liberation Army. While there 
are other insurgent groups in Colombia, only the ELN is large enough to be able to offer 
the FARC-EP a useful ally. The ELN is a Marxist and National Liberation group, 
allowing them to find common ground with the FARC-EP. They have significant 
ideological differences; most notably the ELN has successfully resisted the temptation of 
drug money. Instead, the ELN has relied on kidnapping and extortion for their funds, 
which may not seem morally superior to drug trafficking but is in accordance with ELN’s 
ideology. Despite this principal difference, the FARC-EP and the ELN have cooperated 
in tactical assaults when the conditions were right. However, they have also fought each 
other for territorial control at times.37 
The two rebel groups have both fought together and fought each other, but 
the Colombian Government managed to drive a wedge between them not through 
fighting but by negotiating. The ELN refused to participate in the 1998 Pastrana peace 
talks that temporarily won the FARC-EP a mini-state, the Despeje. Later, while President 
Uribe was relentlessly hounding the FARC-EP, the ELN was negotiating with Uribe. By 
negotiating separately, the Colombian Government effectively split the FARC-EP and the 
ELN, yet neither group has been defeated. 
The other potential domestic allies for the FARC-EP are the drug 
traffickers. The history of the FARC-EP’s involvement in the drug trade is convoluted 
and represents a “marriage of convenience.”38 The FARC-EP has received enormous 
sums of money from drugs, as did their erstwhile sworn enemies the right wing United 
Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC). One of the unintended consequences of 
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President Uribe’s demobilization of the AUC is that some of these groups, reconstituted 
into criminal groups known as BACRIMS, now actually cooperate with their former 
guerrilla enemies in the drug trade. The FARC-EP’s involvement in the drug trade will be 
examined at length in Chapter III, but for now, it is sufficient to say that drug money is 
central to their finances. Once the FARC-EP got over their ideological barriers towards 
the drug trade, there was little the Colombian Government could do to prevent the 
cooperation of narco-trafficking organizations. While there are minor differences at the 
tactical level (the FARC-EP prefers to pay campesinos more for coca leaves than market 
conditions require), both the guerrillas and the traffickers frequently reach a division of 
labor where the FARC-EP protect the coca growers while the BACRIMS process and 
move the cocaine. This relationship is fluid and difficult to break. 
The final possible set of alliances is external, both with nation states and 
other insurgent groups. The FARC-EP has cooperated with the Irish Republican Army, 
gaining urban tactics and Improvised Explosive Device knowledge in the process.39 
However, the IRA stood down in 2005 after reaching a negotiated settlement with the 
British and Irish governments. Further international ties are likely more trouble than they 
are worth. An alliance with Al Qaeda or its affiliates would draw the wrath of the United 
States, resulting at minimum in a drastic increase of Plan Colombia, but more likely 
inviting kinetic American involvement. Outside of Al Qaeda and its affiliates, few 
insurgent groups could offer much to the FARC-EP. The FARC-EP has over 40 years of 
combat experience against an increasingly well-funded and well-trained Colombian 
Army, and deep drug coffers. If anything, other insurgents should be asking the FARC-
EP for assistance. 
State actors are a different story. As North Vietnam and Yugoslavia 
offered safe havens for insurgents in South Vietnam and Greece, Venezuela and Ecuador 
could make up for the FARC-EP’s loss of the territory in Colombia. Both countries have 
“Bolivarian” governments and sympathies for the FARC-EP, and provide covert aid and 
sanctuary. In this way, at least two of Colombia’s neighbors have provided a degree of 
strategic depth to the FARC that has been effectively pressured by the Colombian armed 
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forces at home. FARC-EP controlled territory is valuable for three things—military base 
camps, coca fields, and to demonstrate the insurgents’ superior governance. While 
Venezuela and Ecuador have been willing to allow the first, they have been more 
circumspect with the second two uses. Even their military and logistical support has been 
covert, and they have been quick to disavow it when exposed. The 2008 Andean crisis 
showed that neither Ecuador nor Venezuela was willing publicly to acknowledge direct 
support for the FARC-EP. After the ENC conducted a successful raid three kilometers 
into Ecuador, which resulted in the death of Raúl Reyes, known as the FARC’s “foreign 
minister,” and the capture of over 600 gigabytes of electronic intelligence, several Latin 
American nations protested the violation of Ecuadorian territory by Colombia. 
Nevertheless, the so-called “FARC Files” detailed negotiations with Venezuela to supply 
the guerrillas with small arms, man-portable ant-aircraft missiles, and uranium. 
Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, an ideological supporter of the FARC-EP, was 
quick to disavow any such support. After the short war scare between Colombia and it 
FARC-sympathetic neighbors, it became clear that no nation state was willing to openly 
ally with the FARC-EP.40 
While Venezuela and Ecuador deny association with the FARC-EPs 
illegal activities, there is widespread tolerance for narcotics trafficking and money 
laundering in both countries. The presence of FARC-EP camps and leaders in their safe 
havens is also widely acknowledged. Still, there are limits to the support Venezuela and 
Ecuador are willing to provide. Allowing the FARC-EP to openly use their territory for 
coca cultivation would quickly lead to a nation state becoming an international pariah. 
The 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs demonstrates the general international 
community’s commitment to combat illegal drug production. While there is some 
international tolerance for the FARC-EP as a revolutionary movement (many countries, 
such as Argentina and Brazil do not classify them as a terrorist organization) there is very 
tolerance little for narco-traffickers.41 Bolivia’s withdrawal from the Single Convention 
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on Narcotic Drugs led to some labeling it as a narco-state and even calling for 
international action to impose a regime change.42 As unlikely as it is that the UN, the 
Organization of American States (OAS), or the United States would commit ground 
troops to force a regime change in Bolivia, the United States does have a history of 
clandestine regime change in South America. The United States put Venezuela on an 
“antidrug blacklist” for countries that have notably failed to combat the international drug 
trade, denying them foreign aid.43 While Venezuela is not dependent on America aid, and 
President Chavez appears to enjoy provoking the Norteamericanos, overt drug 
production could result in more serious sanctions, with international support. Both 
Bolivia and Venezuela are walking a fine line, antagonizing the United States while 
remaining below the regime change threshold. Overt support for the FARC-EP’s drug 
business could break that threshold. 
Finally, while Venezuela and Ecuador have not yet allowed the FARC-EP 
to set up a shadow government in a swath of their territory, they tolerate de facto FARC-
EP influence over some border regions, either out of sympathy, corruption, or because 
their militaries are simply unable to exert state presence. While this diminishes the 
legitimacy and power of the nation state in that region, most Latin American states have 
historically been characterized by weak central control. As Hezbollah has become the de 
facto government of large parts of Lebanon, Venezuela and especially Ecuador have seen 
their sovereignty eroded by the FARC-EP control of their territory. While this is a critical 
vulnerability of the FARC-EP, it is not a center of gravity, as the FARC-EP could survive 
without it. 
The Colombian Government has had mixed successes disrupting the 
FARC-EP’s alliances. It has not been able to fracture the FARC-EP, but it has been able 
to divide and erode its relationship with some other Colombian insurgent groups. It has 
not been able to separate the FARC-EP from the narco-traffickers, but the FARC-EP’s 
cooperation with them has been is a wary one based on mutual commercial interests. 
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Despite Colombia’s strained foreign relations with its neighbors, almost leading to war in 
2008, the FARC-EP has been unable to get more than limited covert support from 
sympathetic governments. Eliminating these alliances would certainly hurt the FARC-EP, 
but, it would not destroy it, proving that alliances are not its center of gravity. 
2. Critical Vulnerabilities 
Public opinion is the FARC-EP’s center of gravity. The Colombian Government 
has successful denied the FARC-EP the ability to coerce popular support in many 
regions, and has demonstrated the ability to provide good governance when it applies 
suffice priority to that effort.44 However, the Colombian Government has had the least 
success in denying the FARC-EP the support of coca cultivators. As the Colombian 
Government cannot win the active support of those who make a living cultivating an 
illegal crop, their best approach is to deny the FARC-EP the ability to offer credible 
protection to coca fields. Even if the coca cultivators still resent the government’s 
eradication programs, they would be hesitant to give support to a group that could not 
offer them viable protection. In order to divorce the FARC-EP from its coca supporters, 
the Colombian Government must win the “ground game,” controlling its territory enough 
to deny the FARC-EP freedom of action. 
Territorial control is the FARC-EP’s critical vulnerability. This is not to say in a 
conventional sense, with opposing trench lines clearly marking the extent of the FARC-
EP’s territory, but rather, in the ability to move freely while restricting the state’s access. 
If the ENC requires a full platoon to patrol an area, then it does not control that territory, 
despite its temporary ability to access that space. However, if the National Police (PN) 
routinely dispatches individual officers to walk a beat, then the government controls that 
territory. Conversely, the FARC-EP does not need to hold overt rallies to control an area. 
It simply must be able to access any area it so pleases with a reasonable amount of 
security. In coca cultivating regions, the FARC-EP must exercise enough control to offer 
a reasonable level of protection to the coca fields. Control is mutually exclusive, yet it is 
relative, not binary, in that a group may have varying levels of control, not just “control” 
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or “doesn’t control.”45 Additionally, FARC-EP and the Colombian Government are not 
the only two groups seeking to exercise control. Other guerrilla groups, remnants of the 
right-wing paramilitaries, BACRIMs, and other armed groups contest both the 
government’s and the FARC-EP’s territorial control. Consequently, control is a very 
ambiguous concept, and is much harder to quantify than, say, the destruction of guerrilla 
fronts. 
Identifying the FARC-EP’s critical vulnerability as their ability to control territory 
suggests possible strategies to attack that vulnerability. One possible strategy is to deny 
them intelligence on the state forces. While operational security is an important aspect of 
combating the FARC-EP, the Colombian government cannot hide all potential targets. 
Police informers, special forces patrols, and targeted raids can, and must be obscured 
from the FARC-EP’s visibility. However, the everyday organs of government, the 
policemen, judges, civil servants, doctors, schoolteachers, and others who make the 
modern nation-state possible, must be out in the open in order to function. Tax records 
are available in town halls, which identify targets for kidnapping or extortion. The state 
cannot curtail the insurgents’ ability to locate targets. 
Since the Colombian government cannot deny the FARC-EP intelligence on every 
government appendage, it must instead protect these targets. If the ENC and the police 
can deny the FARC-EP the ability to conduct successful intimidation, then the state’s 
hand is strengthened. The FARC-EP was founded to effect social chance through the use 
or threat of force. If this tactic is denied, then this compromises the FARC-EP’s strategy. 
This effectively highlights the shortcoming of Plan Resistencia. The FARC-EP’s 
successes of the late 1990s demonstrated that they could conduct battalion level 
conventional operations; by following Plan Resistencia and retreating to their jungle 
sanctuaries, they have reverted to stage one guerilla warfare, an operational setback. Did 
the FARC-EP conduct a strategic assessment of their decision to escalate to stage two 
warfare in the 1990s? Was that decision premature or poorly executed?  
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While insurgency doctrine allows for temporary reversions to guerrilla warfare if 
the state proves too strong, history presents a mixed verdict on the effects of interrupting 
the guerrillas’ momentum. The North Vietnamese consistently misjudged the correct time 
to go conventional, suffering costly battlefield defeats in 1968 and 1972, yet were able to 
reconstitute and ultimately defeat South Vietnam. Likewise, Mao himself was virtually 
defeated when he initiated the Long March in 1934, yet he found sanctuary in the interior 
of China, and was later able to emerge victorious. While there are more examples of 
insurgents overcoming temporary setbacks, like the two mentioned, none of them are 
completely analogous with the situation in Colombia. The guerrillas in South Vietnam 
enjoyed considerable support from North Vietnam and the Soviet Union. The Chinese 
Communists overthrew a state weakened by a decade of foreign occupation; moreover, 
the Kuomintang had never truly controlled China before the Japanese invasion. The 
FARC-EP faces a long-established state that enjoys significant support from the sole 
surviving superpower. Unlike Nationalist China or South Vietnam, Colombia has little to 
fear from its neighbors, and can focus its effort on internal stability. 
The Communist insurgency in Greece immediately following World War II may 
provide a better comparison, albeit one that does not bode well for the FARC-EP. The 
Democratic Army of Greece (DSE) was the militant arm of the country’s persecuted 
Communist Party. While the DSE enjoyed greater external support than the FARC-EP, it 
was predominately a domestic insurgency. In 1947, when the Greek Communist 
leadership felt the stage was set for revolution, the DSE “went conventional.” 
Abandoning hit-and run guerrilla tactics, the DSE banked on seizing and holding a 
reasonably sized town to demonstrate their legitimacy. At first, the DSE caught the Greek 
National Army (GNA) off guard. However, with American assistance, the GNA was 
rebuilt. After a year in which the insurgents had pushed operations to within 20 
kilometers of Athens, the superior training and equipment of the GNA came into effect. 
The GNA shattered the DSE’s military formations in successive conventional battles, and 
it became clear that if the DSE continued to attempt to defend its gains, it would be 
annihilated. The insurgents’ only choice was to revert to guerrilla operations.46 
                                                 
46 David H. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War (London: Longman Group Limited, 1995), 212. 
27 
While the DSE’s only chance for survival in 1949 was to revert to the guerrilla 
tactics that worked so well in 1946, this was not a politically viable option. The first 
obstacle to deescalating their operations was ideological. The Greek Communist Party 
leadership had declared that the time was right for revolution in Greece, and the Party 
was always correct. To even suggest reverting to guerrilla warfare implied that the Party 
was mistaken, and such heresy resulted in the execution of several DSE commanders.47 
Outside of Communist theory, deescalating the violence was impossible for the DSE 
from a public relations standpoint. By ending its conventional operations and dispersing, 
after it had declared the liberation of Greece was at hand, the DSE would be tacitly 
admitting defeat. If the peasants of rural Greece perceived the GNA to be winning, they 
would “bandwagon” onto the government’s side, accelerating the DSE’s decline. 
Insurgency is as much about perceptions as it is about military reality. Unwilling to admit 
operational defeat, the DSE suffered a strategic defeat. Does the FARC-EP face a similar 
problem? 
Like the DSE, the FARC-EP had gained the initiative over the ENC during the 
1996–1998 time frame, ambushing and defeating battalion-sized ENC formations. As 
was the case in Greece, the Colombian Armed Forces, FMC, were rebuilt with American 
assistance, and enacted an effective counterattack, disrupting the FARC-EP’s offensive 
and forcing them to delay their planned “liberation” of Bogota. A large factor in the 
FMC’s resurgence was their increase in air power. The number of helicopters more than 
quadrupled as they received modern UH-60 Blackhawks, greatly increasing the ENC’s 
air mobility. This allowed the ENC to bring the fight to previously inaccessible FARC-
EP controlled regions. At the same time, the Colombian Air Force received 25 Super 
Tucano close air support aircraft, suitable for counterinsurgency operations.48 The 
availability of helicopters to evacuated wounded soldiers and the presence of friendly air 
support increased troop morale, subsequently increasing their combat effectiveness.  
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Similarly, the FARC-EP proclaimed the “final liberation” was at hand. However, 
all the branches of the FMC have seen an increase in training and professionalism with 
such dramatic results that people have predicted the defeat of the FARC-EP. The FARC-
EP’s failure to achieve their stated goal has cost them prestige, and may yet result in their 
defeat.49 
Whereas the DSE could not hold significant territory, the Colombian government 
gifted the FARC-EP with an official sanctuary. President Pastrana’s abortive 1998 
negotiations with the FARC-EP formalized guerrilla control of an area the size of 
Switzerland. This territorial concession had far more than mere tactical military 
implications, since it suggested legitimizing the FARC-EP as a political actor. The 
FARC-EP claimed that since they controlled contiguous territory, the conflict in 
Colombia was a civil war, not an insurrection, with the attendant legal ramifications. 
International recognition of the FARC-EP as a lawful combatant would greatly assist 
their cause, and would help to ease the stigma of being on the U.S. State Department’s 
terrorist list. 
Beyond abstract legal ramifications, surrendering a mini-state to the FARC-EP 
was a major strategic milestone for the insurgents. Guerrilla controlled territories have 
become vital to the FARC-EP’s survival. From this territory, they are able to recruit and 
train replacements, launch guerrilla raids into neighboring government-controlled areas, 
and even relax with some beach volleyball.50 In many regions, the FARC-EP lacks 
popular support, so it must coerce the campesinos to prove intelligence, shelter, and 
anonymity, vital supplies for an insurgent. In de jure guerrilla controlled territory, 
intimidating the peasants is even easier than it is in the rest of the countryside. Normally, 
the state and the guerrilla compete for popular support. In the Despeje, the Colombian 
government temporarily ceded a marginal area in order to buy time to demonstrate the 
FARC-EP’s unwillingness to negotiate, while simultaneously rebuild its alliance with  
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Washington and to reconstitute its own forces. Subsequently, the Colombian Government 
took the offensive substantially to reduce the amount of territory under FARC-EP 
control.  
As tempting as it seems to identify the FARC-EP’s ability to avoid destruction at 
the hands of the ENC as their critical vulnerability, that is a chimera. An insurgent 
group’s ability to avoid destruction at the hands of the state is dependent upon one of two 
factors: stealth or combat power. Traditionally, it is stealth that protects nascent insurgent 
groups, then, as the insurgency gains momentum, it will field forces that can defeat 
governmental military units. When the insurgent abandons anonymity, this is when the 
insurgent has “gone conventional.” Depending on the military prowess of the state, an 
insurgent group may choose open battle early in the conflict, or it may be forced to 
remain in the “Dragonworld”51 for extended periods of time. While it may be possible to 
overthrow a weak government without facing them in open battle, the Government of 
Colombia enjoys enough support and legitimacy to give it considerable staying power. It 
is highly unlikely the FARC-EP will be able to overthrow the government without 
expanding is base of support, either willing or coerced.  
One of the false lessons from the American experience in Vietnam is that an 
insurgent organization need not progress beyond guerrilla warfare; rather, it can simply 
outwait its opponent. Enough casualties will drain the state’s will, and then the state will 
capitulate. While this might be effective in a small number of cases, typically where the 
government is unstable to begin with, it is rarely applicable and not a good strategy on 
which an insurgent should rely. While the United States did ultimately lose its will and 
withdraw from South Vietnam mid-conflict, the Republic of Vietnam remained a 
sovereign nation and continued to fight for its survival. It required a conventional 
invasion, complete with tanks and jet fighters, to raise a communist flag in Saigon. 
Additionally, the single biggest factor leading to the American withdrawal was the failed 
1968 Tet Offensive, a premature attempt by the North Vietnamese to go to stage three  
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operations. While a tactical defeat, the Tet Offensive shocked the American public and 
led influential media personalities, such as Walter Cronkite to declare the war 
unwinnable.52  
As in Vietnam, the FARC-EP cannot win by merely outlasting the Government of 
Colombia. The state will not lose its will to fight, and must be actively defeated. This 
requires the FARC-EP to field fronts capable of standing up to the ENC in open battle, 
and winning. But its inability to win on the battlefield does not necessarily translate into 
defeat. Denying the FARC-EP the ability to conduct stage two operations will not lead to 
their total destruction, just continued guerrilla warfare. Therefore, it is not a critical 
vulnerability. 
If the FARC-EP cannot survive through besting the ENC in open combat, it must 
survive through anonymity, blending into Mao’s famous “sea of peasants.” Such 
anonymity requires the assistance of the civilian population it is attempting to use for 
camouflage. With the campesinos aiding the FARC-EP, the insurgents would have an 
early-warning net, allowing them to avoid ENC sweeps. At the same time, they can cache 
their weapons and pretend to be civilians. The FARC-EP has squandered most of its 
potential for popular support through its indiscriminate attacks, which often kill more 
civilians than regime combatants; its widespread use of kidnapping; and other terrorist 
tactics. Yet they retain footholds in remote areas, where the population is traditionally 
hostile to the government, like Neiva or the Bajo Cauca, and where they protect those 
engaged in illicit activities, like coca growing or gold prospecting in Northern Antioquia.  
Absent willing support from the campesinos, the FARC-EP relies on 
“revolutionary justice” to maintain control of the civilians in its territory, and 
punishments for collaboration tend towards the extreme. This can especially be the case 
when government troops temporarily occupy a village then inevitably move on. Since the 
insurgents are still present, they can punish those who assisted the regime’s 
representatives during their short visit. This phenomenon, common in Vietnam, is less of 
a factor in Colombia, where the national government’s strategy is to emplace agents 
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through the country. A permanent police or army presence encourages the campesinos to 
cooperate with the regime, as there is an increased expectation of protection from 
guerrilla reprisals. By extending local police patrols throughout the contested territory, 
the government can bolster popular support, shift the campesinos’ assisted preferences 
towards the regime, and locate guerrilla forces. Unfortunately, in Colombia the police are 
often thin on the ground because municipalities cannot afford to pay them, and they are 
unpopular because they are regarded as corrupt. Defeat of the FARC-EP’s larger fronts 
forces them to go to ground, but will not destroy the organization. Denying the FARC-EP 
the ability to blend in with the civilians once they have gone to ground may lead to the 
destruction of the FARC-EP as an organization in some areas where they do not have 
deep roots. Elsewhere, they can profit from a general atmosphere of lawlessness and 
defiance towards authority as in the barrios of Bogotá, Medellín or Buenaventura.  
The FARC-EP’s support from coca cultivating campesinos may appear to be a 
critical vulnerability, but it relies on the perception that the FARC-EP can protect their 
fields. This protection, in turn, relies on the FARC-EP’s ability to prevent the government 
from destroying those fields, either by denying them knowledge of the locations or 
making it too costly for the government to destroy them. The FARC-EP must deny the 
government the ability to maintain its presence throughout contested regions by forcing 
the consolidation of small military and police units, which in turn cannot cover as much 
territory. In the fight for “control,” the government must push its presence down to the 
local level in the smallest possible units, while the insurgent must eliminate small units 
and force the regime to concentrate its agents into the largest possible units, with the 
corresponding loss of presence in the space between government pockets. In this space, 
the FARC-EP can protect coca fields, intimidate uncooperative civilians, and establish 
shadow governments, all to shift public opinion towards the insurgents. 
3. Metrics 
This suggests an obvious metric to measure progress in counterinsurgency: the 
size of the average unit of regime agents. If the regime can send individual policemen on 
foot-patrols with an acceptable chance of survival, than it controls the territory being 
patrolled and offers little space for the insurgents to operate. Conversely, if entire 
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battalions are swallowed up by the insurgents, as happened to the French on Route 
Coloniale 4 in 1950, then that is obviously guerrilla controlled territory. However, where 
does the line between government control and insurgent control lie? Is it at squad-sized 
patrols? Or two-man rural police outposts? There are neighborhoods in the United States 
that the police will not patrol individually, but this does not mean that those 
neighborhoods are insurgent controlled. There may not be a hard number, the minimum 
number of troops required to conduct a patrol that decides which side controls a given 
area. Likewise, the nature of the government’s presence affects the degree to which it 
controls territory. A Special Forces “A” Team or a Marine rifle squad in the CIDG or 
CAP53 programs effectively controlled its assigned village in Vietnam, while a 
comparable number of troops riding around in up-armored HMMWVs or a pair of 
riverine patrol boats do not even control out to the maximum range of their weapons 
today. 
It is tempting to measure control by the number of casualties the government 
suffers while conducting presence missions, the number of police stations bombed, the 
number of schools burnt out, and other attacks upon regime representatives. Yet heavy 
casualties inflicted upon a counterinsurgency force may indicate one of two things. The 
army may be suffering losses because the insurgents have the advantage, are gaining 
momentum, and are on the verge of winning. Or they may be taking casualties because 
the army is successfully forcing the guerrillas to fight, and is destroying the insurgent 
organization despite taking heavy casualties. These two scenarios demonstrate the same 
statistics, yet diametrically opposed interpretations. Furthermore, heavy casualties 
indicative of pitched battles, even if the state is winning them, do not necessarily favor 
the state. The mere fact that the state must fight these battles means that the insurgent has 
sufficient strength to form large units and has contemplated going conventional, 
indicating regime weakness. Still, heavy government casualties do not automatically 
indicate an insurgent advantage. Perhaps the best example of this is the infamous 1968 
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Tet Offensive. U.S. forces took heavier casualties in February 1968 than any other month 
of the war, yet did so in the process of destroying the Viet Cong as an effective fighting 
force.54  
Just as heavy casualties do not indicate success or failure for the state, the lack of 
casualties is likewise an inconclusive metric. Low casualties may indicate that the 
insurgents have been defeated and lack the ability to inflict casualties, or they may simply 
be laying low and avoiding confrontations. Low regime casualties may indicate that there 
is little or no guerrilla presence in an area or it may indicate little regime presence, as all 
its troops have been withdrawn into fortified based camps. Hiding behind concertina wire 
and minefields is an effective way to limit friendly casualties in the short term, but it is 
counterproductive in the long term. If the state refuses to emerge from its shelter, then the 
guerrillas have won a major victory without having to fight. If the army limits its patrols 
“beyond the wire,” it will limit casualties at the price of allowing the guerillas space and 
time to recruit, train, and generally prepare to overthrow the state.  
While friendly casualties are a poor metric in counterinsurgency, enemy 
casualties may be the worst measure to judge progress. Not only is it difficult to get an 
accurate picture of the insurgents’ strength by measuring his losses, a body count 
mentality encourages behavior that is counterproductive to effective counterinsurgency 
strategy. As with friendly casualties, high enemy kill rates do not account for insurgent 
recruitment, and the guerrillas may be able to make good their losses despite heavy 
casualties. Likewise, a low body count may indicate that the insurgent is successfully 
avoiding contact with the army, or that he is simply running out of warm bodies. But 
worse than the possibly misleading nature of body count statistics, measuring progress in 
terms of enemy killed leads to pressure for tactical commanders to increase their kills. 
Andrew Krepinevich did a wonderful job illustrating how such pressures caused the U.S. 
Army in Vietnam to blur the line between enemy combatants and civilians who just 
happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Such bloodthirsty tactics cost the  
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U.S. popular support, both from the South Vietnamese and its own domestic audience. 
Random harassment and interdiction artillery fire into unobserved sectors is not a good 
way to win friends among the local population.55 
Another metric currently in vogue with counterinsurgency experts is measuring 
which side initiates contacts, the theory being that whichever side initiates the majority of 
the engagements is winning. Like the previously discussed casualties metrics, this 
measurement can be interpreted to indicate different circumstances. At first glance, it is 
preferable to be on the side that is doing the ambushing, rather than the side being 
ambushed, and this is certainly true at the lowest tactical level. Conventional wisdom 
would have the guerrillas choosing to fight only when they enjoyed local force 
superiority and stand a good chance of winning the battle; otherwise, they would merely 
melt away into the jungle. Following this logic, if the guerrillas were initiating the 
majority of engagements, they would be victorious in the majority of these contacts, 
showing the advantage shifting towards the insurgent. However, the guerrilla’s ability to 
refuse battle is only 100% in a theoretical world. In the real world, insurgent 
organizations attempt to seize control of territory, and then must defend that territory. By 
threatening critical guerrilla infrastructure, such as training camps, command centers, or, 
in the case of the FARC-EP, coca fields, the army can force the insurgents to offer battle 
at a disadvantage. Again, in theory, there should be no physical location so critical to an 
insurgent organization that it will be forced to defend it in open battle. But the real world 
history of guerrilla warfare proves that such an organization must control territory or it 
will be marginalized as a terrorist group, and then as mere criminals. While this is no 
magic formula to force guerrillas to stand and fight, it has been done, and so guerrilla 
initiated contacts are not necessarily negative indicators for the state. 
Likewise, while the state would prefer that its army initiate the majority of 
engagements with the insurgents, doing so is not automatically an indicator that the war 
is going well for the state. Indeed, it can be a sign of imminent regime collapse, as was 
seen in Vietnam with the Mobile Guerrilla Force. Under this program, companies of 
Montagard tribesmen, led by American Special Forces soldiers, were deployed into Viet 
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Cong sanctuaries to “out-guerrilla the guerrillas.” They racked up an impressive kill ratio, 
ambushing Viet Cong Main Force and North Vietnamese Army units, and often initiated 
contact with the Communists. Both the high enemy body counts and the government-
controlled engagements would seem indicative of regime strength. Deeper analysis, 
however, reveals that the reason the Mobile Guerrilla Force enjoyed such good hunting 
was the large amount of game, Communist troops, present in there operational areas.56 In 
this instance, the metric that the army was initiating the majority of engagements with the 
insurgents was more indicative of the insurgents having progressed to conventional 
warfare, and the government being in danger of imminent defeat. 
C. CONCLUSION 
By conducting a net assessment of the FARC-EP as an ideological movement 
with a populist political and social agenda in a Latin American context, this chapter 
demonstrates how to analyze a revolutionary group in order to determine the correct 
metrics to gauge process. In the case of the FARC-EP, their center of gravity is the 
popular support they enjoy in their sanctuaries, whether it is coerced or because of the 
advantages the FARC-EP presence and protection brings to the inhabitants. This support 
exists only as long as there are gaps in the state’s authority that allow the insurgents to 
operate. Deny the FARC-EP this space, and they will lose control of the contested 
territory. Without this control, they have less to offer their supporters, and will lose 
popular support, thereby denying them funding, recruits and anonymity, and guerrillas 
who cannot hide amongst the civilian population have short life expectancies. 
Assessing the FARC-EP’s center of gravity and critical vulnerability is rather 
straightforward; unfortunately, no simple metric exists that can tell whether the 
government controls a given area. The metrics discussed above can be alternatively 
interpreted to indicate that either side has the advantage. Ideally, the absence of FARC-
EP attacks in a region would be an indicator of government control. However, if the 
FARC-EP has the local peasants cowed or seduced into cooperation, and the local regime 
representatives are inviolate yet ineffective in well-defended fortifications that they rarely 
leave, then the guerrillas need not conduct attacks in that region, as they have already 
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won control. The best metrics to measure the level of government control is the average 
size of regime outposts and patrol, how much time the regime representatives spend 
interacting with the local population, and the casualty rates among those isolated small 
units. Viewed as a set, these metrics indicate whether the regime or the rebels control a 
region; individually, they are potentially misleading. 
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III. THE FARC AS A CRIMINAL ORGANIZATION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Another school of thought focuses less on popular following and more on FARC-
EP’s resources. Some argue that it could not survive without resources. In fact, resources 
in the form of cocaine have become the raison d’être of the FARC-EP, to the point that in 
some areas the FARC-EP has become a criminal cartel. However, whether it is an 
ideological movement or a criminal organization, targeting resources also presents 
problems. 
The indigenous people who inhabited the Andes Mountains have used coca leaves 
as a stimulant since ancient times. In addition to providing energy, coca leaves contain 
valuable nutrients, and chewing them was literally a life or death matter for the 
indigenous peoples. Coca was so important that they measured distance in cocada, the 
distance a man could walk on a single mouthful of leaves. Chewing coca leaves 
introduces only a limited amount of the cocaine alkaloid into the user’s bloodstream, 
resulting in a mild sense of exhilaration, as well as numbing the mouth, and suppressing 
hunger, thirst, and fatigue. Coca tea, mate de coca, is thought by many to prevent altitude 
sickness. Like chewing, mate de coca is an inefficient method to ingest the cocaine 
alkaloid, and results in effects similar to drinking caffeinated beverages. Coca has been a 
part of Andean life for millennia, but it was not until the modern age that it was refined 
into cocaine.57 
In 1855, German chemist Friedrich Gaedcke first isolated cocaine from coca 
leaves, which soon found a number of uses. Cocaine was included in patent medicines, 
and promoters promised a wide variety of beneficial side effects. Cocaine was used as a 
local anesthetic and to treat morphine addiction, while Europeans valued its hunger- and 
fatigue suppressing qualities. Famously, the original recipe for Coca-Cola included coca 
leaves.58 
                                                 




Despite cocaine’s original acceptance in European and North American society, 
by the beginning of the 20th century it was apparent that it was highly addictive and had 
serious side effects. In the United States, the growing prohibition movement resulted in 
the 1914 Harrison Narcotics Tax Act, which outlawed cocaine, as well as narcotics, such 
as opium. Coca-Cola had already changed its formula in 1906 to used coca leaves that 
had been chemically treated to remove the cocaine alkaloid. Due to social stigma, cocaine 
use in the United States dropped off sharply after the Harrison Act, and illegal use of 
cocaine was rare until the late 1970s. U.S. cocaine use peaked around 1982–1984 with 
approximately nine million users before dropping rapidly.59 The U.S. government 
estimated approximately 4.7 million cocaine users in America in 2010, representing a 
considerable decrease since its peak. However, recent statistics show that the number of 
new cocaine users has remained constant, around 650,000, since 2008.60 The constant 
source of new cocaine users indicates that demand reduction in the United States has 
stagnated at best, or reached its natural limit, requiring more emphasis be placed on 
supply reduction in order to positively affect trends on the War on Drugs. 
The sharp spike in cocaine use in the early 1980s enabled the rise of various drug 
cartels in Mexico and Colombia, of which the Medellín cartel was the most powerful. 
Run by Pablo Escobar, the Medellín cartel was worth an estimated $28 billion, and 
Escobar himself was listed as the seventh richest man in the world by Forbes magazine. 
The very existence of democratic rule in Colombia was threatened, with the distinct 
possibility of the drug cartels turning Colombia into an outlaw narcotics state.61 One 
response was the rise of Los Pepes, a vigilante group would later influence the formation 
of the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia, AUC, a vehemently anti-FARC right-
wing paramilitary organization.62 
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The FARC-EP originally abstained from involvement in drug trafficking, but the 
Seventh Guerilla Conference in 1982 decided to take advantage of narco dollars. At first, 
the FARC-EP limited its involvement to revolutionary taxes on all aspects of cocaine 
production, from coca leaves to processing agents to cocaine base shipments through its 
territory. Additionally, the FARC-EP provided security for coca fields, for a price.63 The 
death of Jacobo Arenas, an opponent of drug trafficking, eliminated the FARC-EP’s 
ideological barrier to cocaine production and the PNC’s successful campaigns against the 
cartels created an opening for greater FARC-EP involvement in the cocaine industry. 
Rather than protecting others’ coca crops, the FARC-EP took over plant cultivation, as 
well as processing the leaves into cocaine base. The Despeje granted to the FARC-EP by 
President Pastrana allowed them to greatly increase their coca production, and the FARC-
EP was soon trafficking billions of dollars’ worth of cocaine. By March 2006, the U.S. 
Department of Justice declared that the FARC-EP was the world’s largest producer of 
cocaine.64 
Cocaine production offers immense profits for the FARC-EP. Coca leaves sell for 
around $1–2 per kilogram, coca base around $800–1000 per kilogram, and $20,000–
30,000 per kilogram wholesale in the United States. Despite this mark-up, retail dealers 
realize huge profits, selling individual doses for around $120–140 per gram, or 
$120,000–140,000 per kilogram. Clearly, the farmers who cultivate coca leaves realize 
hardly any profit, selling their product for dollars per kilo. It takes around 100 kilos of 
coca leaves to produce a kilo of coca base leaving the initial processors with a respectable 
300% profit, similar to what retail distributers in consumer nations enjoy. Coca paste 
yields pure cocaine on an approximately two-to-one ratio, meaning that the group who 
turns coca paste into wholesale cocaine realizes around 1,000% profit. This process turns 
$400 of coca leaves into $20,000 of wholesale product, nearly 5,000 percent profit. 
Multiplied by the estimated 400 metric tons that gets past interdiction efforts (estimating 
the amount of cocaine that is not intercepted is inherently troublesome, and this chapter 
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will discuss why such estimations are almost certainly low), means that the Colombian 
cocaine trade is an $8 billion a year industry. Not all of that money goes straight to the 
FARC-EP. Within Colombia, they are not the only producer of cocaine, and profit is 
extracted at all levels of transportation and distribution. Frequently, the FARC-EP 
collects taxes and protection fees on drug traffickers rather than process and traffic the 
drugs themselves. Regardless, the FARC-EP is making hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually off the cocaine trade.65 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Center of Gravity 
Accessing the FARC-EP as a criminal gang primarily interested in maximizing 
profit through cocaine production suggests several centers of gravity that differ radically 
than if they are an ideological revolutionary movement interested in replacing the 
democratic government of Colombia with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Lietes and 
Wolf addressed counter-insurgency from an economics viewpoint, translating inputs into 
recruits and products into guerrilla attacks and so forth, but the FARC-EP as a drug 
producer allows a more direct application of economic theory. Inputs include the coca 
leaves and the chemicals required to process them into cocaine, production is the 
processing itself, and distribution is the trafficking of cocaine into consumer nations. 
Supply is an aggregate of these factors, resulting in the amount of “dime bags” available 
for retail sales, and demand is a function of the numbers of users in the market.66 Output 
is the drug money, which is useless to the FARC-EP unless it can be laundered or 
physically shipped back to Colombia. Traditionally, American counter drug efforts have 
focused primarily on reducing supply, while Colombia can only attack cocaine supply, as 
the demand for drugs in the United States or Europe is beyond Bogotá’s ability to 
influence.67 
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a. Production 
Coca production offers a tempting possible center of gravity. A kilo of 
processed cocaine can be concealed inside a human “mule,” a hectare of coca leaves is 
10,000 square meters of crops that cannot move for the three months it takes before 
newly planted coca is ready for harvest, making coca fields appear a more vulnerable 
target than processed cocaine. Eradication, however, is not that easy. The land area of 
Colombia is 1,038,700 square kilometers, or 103,870,000 hectares. The 77,000 hectares 
estimated to be under coca cultivation represents less than one percent of Colombia’s 
territory, and most of it is located in the sparsely populated (and sparsely governed) 
southeastern part of the country. Additionally, coca farmers take steps to disguise their 
fields, intermingling coca plants with legitimate crops to discourage the government from 
spraying defoliates.68 Coca cultivation is clearly vital for the production of cocaine, but 
how realistic is eradication?69 Might there be another aspect in the production of cocaine 
that is easier to disrupt? 
The next stage of cocaine production is processing coca leaves into coca 
paste, which is usually handled by the cartels and, increasingly, the BACRIMS. Since it 
takes approximately 100 kilos of leaves to make one kilo of paste, it is preferable to 
process the coca as close to it source as possible. Disrupting the initial processing of coca 
would force the cartels to ship coca leaves rather than more compact forms of the drug, 
and would have some negative impact on their profit margin. However, processing leaves 
into paste requires only a few simple ingredients, notably sodium carbonate and kerosene, 
that are readily available in grocery stores, and a small, plastic lined pit or 55-gallon 
drum. Paste labs can be easily concealed and quickly moved, making this a difficult stage 
to disrupt. While shipping coca paste is preferable to coca leaves, denying the cartels the 
ability to process coca leaves is impractical and would not lead to a collapse of the drug 
trade.70 
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The next step is to refine coca paste into cocaine base, a more difficult 
process than that of scraping coca leaves. It requires chemicals that are not found in 
grocery stores, such as sulfuric or hydrochloric acid, and potassium permanganate. These 
labs are larger and less mobile than paste producing sites, but are still relatively small and 
hard to detect. Since the paste is easier to transport than coca leaves, labs can be located 
further from the coca fields, and are often near airstrips to allow easy export of the 
product. While cocaine base is more compact than the paste, and can be transported, it is 
often refined onto finished cocaine, cocaine hydrochloride, at the same location. This 
stage is the most difficult, and the most dangerous. It requires skilled technicians and a 
more complex laboratory. While the second and third stage processing facilities may 
seem to be better targets than the first stage ones, they are by no means a center of 
gravity. During the 1980s much third stage cocaine processing was done in Mexico as 
cocaine paste is easy enough to transport out of the country for further refining. 
Disrupting the final processing of coca paste would prompt the cartels and BACRIMS to 
shift facilities outside Colombia, reducing but not eliminating the protection money paid 
to the FARC-EP.71 
b. Distribution 
Processing of coca leaves into cocaine is not a center of gravity, as the 
cartels could simple ship coca paste, or even the leaves, to external processing sites. Is 
distribution then the center of gravity for the Colombian drug trade? Interdiction certainly 
has appeal for both politicians and government agencies in the United States, if not as 
much in Colombia. Cocaine seizures look impressive when taken out of context; a pile of 
intercepted cocaine bales or a press release announcing the capture of 5 metric tons of 
cocaine indicates another victory in the War on Drugs, but how many drug shipments got 
through undetected that same day? Interdiction operations are “sexy” compared to 
eradication or crop substitution programs—no politician is going to pose for a photograph 
in a defoliated coca field! Because initiatives like the War on Drugs have translated into 
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increased funding for several U.S. agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard and the Drug 
Enforcement Agency have become advocates for interdiction.72 
Despite its appeal, interdiction is a questionable tactic. It is estimated that 
60% of cocaine shipments are intercepted by law enforcement agencies. While this is a 
questionable statistic, even assuming that it is accurate, the 5000 percent markup cocaine 
offers means that the 40% that does get through may easily compensate for any loses.73 
Trafficking takes many forms, from multi-ton shipments onboard private aircraft, “go-
fast” offshore racing boats, and now submarines constructed in jungle estuaries, to multi-
kilo packets concealed in commercial shipments, to cocaine-filled condoms that are 
smuggled internally by low-paid human mules. Regardless of the method, no individual 
shipment is vital to the FARC-EP’s finances. Theoretically, complete interdiction would 
put the FARC-EP out of the drug business, but that is not a realistic goal. As long as 
profits remain astronomical, the smugglers will find a method to get drugs into the United 
States. 
c. Money 
The Colombian narco-traffickers use the Black Market Peso Exchange 
(BPME) to launder drug money. Brokers in Colombia buy the dollars for pesos, while 
leaving the dollars in the United States. The brokers then use the American dollars to pay 
for American trade goods, which are imported to Colombia and sold for pesos. This 
system exploits a weakness in American financial oversight—manufacturers and 
distributors are not subject to the same anti-money laundering regulations that apply to 
banks. Since the early 2000s, the BPME system has shifted to include smuggling 
American dollars into Mexico, where looser financial regulations allow more flexibility, 
but with the same result. In both cases, the most vulnerable phase, when dirty money 
enters the legitimate financial system, takes place outside Colombia.74 As with reducing 
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the demand for cocaine, there is little the Colombian Government can do to combat 
money laundering outside Colombia. Therefore, the Colombian Government must look 
elsewhere. 
d. Personnel 
Finally, personnel are a possible center of gravity, and one that the 
Colombian government can target. However, all the factors that eliminate personnel from 
being a center of gravity in Chapter II remain true. There is no shortage of individuals 
willing to take over for neutralized leaders, as demonstrated by the long list of drug lords 
killed or jailed by the Search Block, the PNC, the FBI, the DEA, and so forth. Lehder, 
Ochoa, Escobar, Rodriquez, Santacruz, all of them were among the most power men in 
the world, but the loss of none of them disrupted the drug trade for long. Likewise, the 
FARC-EP has suffered a string of leadership losses—Reyes, Vélez, Briceño, and Cano in 
recent years, yet continues to function. The potential to amass huge fortunes will attract 
replacement leaders regardless of how many are eliminated. The same holds true for foot 
soldiers, for whom the FARC-EP offers the prospect of social mobility in a stratified 
Colombian society. As long as producing drugs offers a better lifestyle, status and 
opportunity than their legal alternatives, there will be no shortage of recruits for the drug 
traffickers.  
By process of elimination, the center of gravity for the FRAC-EP as a 
criminal organization is the cultivation of coca leaves. Without coca, there can simply be 
no cocaine. Processing coca can be done in Colombia or outside the country, and 
trafficking the finished product can be done on land, by sea, or in the air, in freight 
shipments, or on human couriers. There are numerous methods to smuggle cocaine into 
the United States, and enough drugs will get through to pay for intercepted shipments. 
The Colombian government cannot decrease demand for cocaine in the United States or 
Europe, and killing individual drug lords only creates job openings. The only way the 
Colombian government can significantly reduce the FARC-EP’s narcotics income is to 
reduce the amount of coca leaves available for processing into cocaine. 
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2. Critical Vulnerability 
Identifying coca supply as the FARC-EP’s center of gravity suggests two possible 
critical vulnerabilities: eradication and crop substitution. Both aim to reduce the amount 
of coca cultivated; one through coercion, the other through cooperation. Plan Colombia 
emphasizes eradication, and U.S. officials proudly point out the number of hectares 
sprayed.75 Crop substitution is not as impressive to report, and receives less attention. 
Can either approach effectively reduce the amount of coca cultivated in Colombia? 
Coca eradication, like interdiction, is a highly visible function of the War on Drug 
that produces easy to report, impressive sounding statistics, but the actual details of 
eradication are far more mundane. Using aerial photography, coca fields are identified by 
measuring reflected light. Fields are then either sprayed with chemicals toxic to coca 
plants or destroyed by ground troops, manually burning or cutting the plants. Ground 
operations are dangerous, as coca fields are typically located in guerrilla strongholds, and 
can expect armed opposition. Spraying is quicker, but can be constrained by adjacent 
crops, villages, national parks, or other locations it would be inadvisable to douse in 
plant-killing chemicals. Additionally, aerial defoliation operations are not without their 
own risks, and the threat of ground fire forces sprayer aircraft to remain high, widely 
dispersing fumigants and increasing the likelihood of destroying adjacent legitimate 
crops. Beyond the tactical difficulty of eradicating a given coca field, identifying fields is 
a difficult task, given the nature of Colombia’s geography. 
Eradication has many detractors, for a variety of reasons. The environmental 
impact of destroying thousands of hectares of crops, possibly resulting in soil erosion, is 
one negative effect of eradication. Worse is the economic impact upon the campesinos, 
the very people the government is must win over in order to defeat the FARC-EP. 
Destroying an individual coca field has little impact on the FARC-EP, but can mean 
starvation for the campesino cultivating it. Beyond that, eradication has proven 
ineffective. At first glance, eradication efforts in Colombia have been successful. 44,158 
hectares of coca plants were destroyed in 1999; 145,731 hectares in 2010, and the area 
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under cultivation has fallen from 160,100 hectares in 1999 to 62,000 hectares in 2010. 
Eradication efforts have increased by about 100,000 hectares, and production has fallen 
by about 100,000 hectares—success! Another 60,000 hectares and victory in the War on 
Drugs.76  
Closer examination of the record of cocaine eradication reveals a less favorable 
interpretation. From 1999 to 2010, the Government of Colombia, with American 
assistance, has destroyed over 1,740,000 hectares of coca, or more than ten times the total 
amount of coca fields in Colombia in 1999, yet the campesinos continue to cultivate coca, 
albeit at reduced rates from the height of the 1980s.77 Economics dictates that destroying 
coca fields reduces the supply of coca leaves, increasing the price of leaves, and 
incentivizing more campesinos to cultivate coca, ultimately restoring coca production to 
equilibrium. While individual farmers are hurt by eradication, overall it does not affect 
the drug trade.78 
Likewise, crop substitution is a noble idea that cannot stand up to real-world 
economics. A number of factors, such as the poor infrastructure in the coca-growing 
areas of Colombia that make it difficult to ship produce to market, lower the value of 
non-coca crops in the area. Coca is the only crop where the buyer comes directly to the 
producer, alleviating the campesino’s requirement to transport his crop to market. A 
hectare of coca is some 40 times more profitable than any other potential crop. Crop 
substitution means asking the campesinos to take a massive pay cut. Alone, there is no 
reason for them to voluntarily do so, which is why the eradication effort has some 
potential value. Currently, approximately one-half of coca fields are brought to harvest, 
so a campesino has a fifty percent chance of realizing 40 times more revenue than he 
would with legal crops. If the individual campesino perceives that the potential benefits 
of cultivating coca outweigh the risks of possible eradication, then he will grow coca. 
Theoretically, an effective eradication program would raise the risks to the point where 
cultivating coca was a bad investment, but such a program would also raise the price of 
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coca, increasing the potential payoff, and thus the acceptable risk. Such a cycle means 
that the Colombian campesinos will continue to grow coca as long as it is profitable.79 
On closer examination, crop substitution does not actually require campesinos to 
plant legitimate crops. Rather, crop substitution really means job substitution, as the 
Colombian government must find employment for the campesinos other than growing 
coca. That can be cultivating coffee, or it can be working in an urban factory. The idea is 
not to increase the amount of legitimate crops grown in Colombia, but to reduce the 
economic incentive to grow coca. Colombian campesinos do not grow coca because they 
love working the land, but because it is their best option to earn income. In fact, many 
coca growers are urban immigrants unable to find gainful employment in the cities. Crop 
substitution limits them to farmers, regardless of what they are growing. As nations 
develop, a smaller percentage of their workers are employed in agriculture, and as 
Colombia develops economically, less of its people will work on its farms. Colombia 
must approach it as a job substitution problem, not crop substitution. 
Ultimately, basic economics determines the FARC-EP’s critical vulnerability. The 
price of coca leaves remains low because of abundant labor. If the campesinos find more 
lucrative employment elsewhere, they will stop cultivating coca. The FARC-EP can 
always raise the price of coca leaves to encourage its cultivation, but doing so cuts into 
their profit margin. As 200 kilos of coca leaves are required to produce one kilo of 
cocaine, an increase in coca price reduces profits by 200 times the increase. Currently, 
cultivating coca leaves is so much more profitable than any other crop that crop 
substitution is unlikely to work, regardless of the pressures of eradication. The supply of 
coca cannot be forcibly reduced, but farmers can by lured away into higher paying jobs. 
The low cost of food in the United States would seem to invalidate this strategy, 
but that is not the case. American farms produce low cost product despite the availability 
of high paying jobs in other sectors, but this is due to mechanization, which in turn is 
facilitated by economies of scale. Agricultural machinery represents large capital outlays, 
and only large farms can afford million dollar combines. Illicit coca fields must remain 
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small to avoid detection, so modern mechanized agricultural methods cannot be applied 
to coca production. Agricultural goods in the United States are cheap because of 
technology, not low wages. Coca leaves are cheap because of low wages in Colombia. 
Thus, the FARC-EP’s critical vulnerability is Colombia’s economy. Improving the 
economic situation of the campesinos will hurt the FARC-EP. The problem is conceiving 
a viable way to do this.80 
3. Metrics 
Assuming the FARC-EP’s critical vulnerability is the poverty of the campesinos it 
relies on for cheap coca leaves introduces a set of metrics alien to many soldiers, such as 
Gini coefficient,81 as well as more familiar ones, such as GDP growth rate. Increasing 
Colombia’s GDP alone simply means the rich are getting richer while the campesinos 
remain poor. Decreasing the Gini coefficient means more economic equality, but does 
that mean the poor are getting richer, or the rich are getting poorer? While these metrics 
are vital indicators of Colombia’s economic health, they do not directly reflect the state 
of the drug trade. The Gini coefficient could be decreasing because the campesinos are 
getting a better price for their coca leaves, or they are selling more leaves, neither of 
which helps counter-narcotics efforts. Likewise, an increase in Colombia’s GDP could 
simply mean the drug traffickers have found better ways to launder money and then 
recycle it in the legal Colombian economy. 
While improving Colombia’s economy is vital to reducing the supply of cocaine, 
that supply must be directly measured to get a feel for the status of the War on Drugs. 
The illicit nature of the drug trade contradicts any attempts to measure the supply of 
cocaine. The best metric would be the amount of cocaine smuggled into the United 
States, but that number is impossible to determine accurately. Various agencies and 
organizations release statistics estimating the amount of drugs that enter the United States 
and Europe undetected, but those numbers are inaccurate and potentially biased based on 
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the nature of the reporting organization. An agency charged with stopping the flow of 
cocaine, such as the DEA, will naturally estimate low, and will attempt to show a 
downward trend. It is unlikely that the FARC-EP will challenge the DEA’s estimate. 
Conversely, a drug legalization group may estimate high, to demonstrate the futility of 
outlawing narcotics. Absent capturing the FARC-EP’s ledger, such numbers are useless. 
Likewise, intercepted drug shipments make for good press releases, but offer little 
insight into the progress of the War on Drugs. An increase in the amount of shipments 
stopped by law enforcement can mean that fewer less drugs are getting through, or that 
more drugs are being shipped, increasing the chance of interception. Likewise, a lack of 
intercepted shipments may mean that the smugglers have a new, unknown method to 
disguise their drugs, or there are less drugs being shipped. Without knowing the total 
amount of drugs being trafficked, interdiction numbers are meaningless. 
As discussed in the eradication section, area under coca cultivation might be a 
useful metric, but suffers the same failing as the estimates of total drug supply. The 
campesinos attempt to hide their coca fields, which casts doubts onto the accuracy of 
estimation attempts. Again, such a metric would be useful if it were possible to measure 
accurately. 
Lastly, the street price for a retail dose of cocaine or crack cocaine is probably the 
best metric available to gauge progress in combating narcotics. Still, while the best 
measure available, it is an imperfect tool. Price is a factor of both supply and demand, so 
an increase in street price may indicate success, as the supply of cocaine is decreasing, or 
it may indicate more users, not the sought-after goal. A decline in price works in a similar 
fashion. Moreover, the supply-demand curve for cocaine is unresponsive for several 
reasons. Crack cocaine is usually retailed at set amounts, such as ten dollar doses, hence 
“dime bags.” Due to their illegal nature, retail drug deals are hurried affairs, without the 
opportunity to evaluate the product being purchased or to make change. Street dealers can 
fiddle with purity to some extent, but even they do not know the exact composition of 
what they are selling. Due to its addictive nature, demand for crack cocaine is largely 
independent of price, while freebase, usually seen as an upper-class drug, can be a  
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prestige good, where demand actually increases as price increases. The street value of 
cocaine is an imperfect metric, but the best one available to measure the supply of 
cocaine in the market.82 
C. CONCLUSION 
Analysis of the FARC-EP as a narco-criminal group indicates that their supply of 
coca leaves to process into cocaine is their center of gravity. Without coca, the FARC-EP 
would become solely an ideological revolutionary group, and an unpopular and ill-funded 
one. As long as there are coca leaves, and a market for cocaine, the FARC-EP will exist 
in some form, be it drug-dealing revolutionaries or simply narco-criminals. Further 
analysis demonstrates that the critical vulnerability that best attacks this center of gravity 
is the economic conditions that make cultivating coca attractive to the campesinos of 
Colombia. The farmers act in their own self-interest to maximize personal profit, and 
eradication efforts alone defy the law of supply and demand. The more hectares of coca 
are destroyed, the higher the price of coca, which in turn encourages more coca 
cultivation. 
Coca cultivation cannot be stopped through coercive measures alone, but must be 
discouraged through a comprehensive economic development plan that offers alternative 
sources of income to would-be growers. This focus on economic development to defeat 
the FARC-EP’s cocaine trafficking suggests economic metrics to measure progress, but 
to use such metrics is to commit the same mistake the British Admiralty did 80 years ago, 
that of confusing one possible strategy with the desired end state. The Colombian 
Government’s ultimate objective is to reduce the amount of narcotics being trafficked. 
Crop substitution is but one approach to this, as sinking U-Boats is only one method to 
ensure sufficient supplies cross the Atlantic. As the Colombian Government cannot 
influence cocaine demand, it must reduce supply, and the best metric to reliably measure 
cocaine supply is street price, assuming inelastic demand. Measuring the price of cocaine  
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in the United States may seem like an indirect way to assess the fight against the FARC-
EP in Colombia, but it is the metric that best reflects the nature of the problem and its 
solution. 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Net assessment shows the FARC-EP is fundamentally an ideological group 
despite their involvement in cocaine production and trafficking. They have consistently 
pursued their ideological goals, even to the degree of hurting their narcotics revenue. Had 
their primary motivation been amassing drug fortunes, they would not have threatened 
the existence of the state of Colombia, and they would have attracted less attention from 
the United States, attention that has translated into Plan Colombia and the nadir if not 
demise of the FARC-EP. The Despeje would have represented complete victory for the 
FARC-EP had they been a narco-criminal organization. 16,200 square miles would easily 
hide the entire annual coca production of Colombia, and did allow the FARC-EP ample 
space to produce cocaine during the Pastrana peace process. However, the FARC-EP was 
not content with control of a mere fraction of the country, and viewed the Despeje as a 
sanctuary from which to expand their control. In February 2002, they hijacked an aircraft, 
kidnapped Colombian Senator Jorge Eduardo Gechem Turbay and conducted a series of 
urban bombings.83 As a result of their continued revolutionary activities, President 
Pastrana called off the peace talks and ordered the ENC to retake the Despeje. As narco-
criminals, this was a major miscalculation. As ideological guerillas, continued operations 
from their safe haven were the only way eventually to overthrow the Government of 
Colombia. 
Plan Colombia was envisioned by then-President Andrés Pastrana Arango as a 
“Marshall Plan for Colombia,”84 asking the United States for help with social and 
economic reforms to undermine the population’s support for the FARC-EP. Washington 
chose instead to emphasize the counter-narcotic aspects of the plan, devoting more than 
60% of aid to military instead of developmental projects.85 At first, the impact was 
questionable, but continued net assessment shows that Plan Colombia and Colombia’s 
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own Plan Patriota have resulted in a dramatic reversal in the FARC-EP’s fortunes. The 
Colombia Army has taken the fight to the FARC-EP, disrupting FARC-EP base areas, 
killing multiple high level leaders, and reducing the total amount of coca produced, 
attacking both the insurgency and the drug trade.86  
1. Counter Insurgency Metrics 
The ENC’s battlefield successes have translated into improved security in many 
regions. Both the Colombian government and military are happy to broadcast metrics, 
such as a decrease in political assassinations,87 kidnappings,88 and defections.89 While all 
of these potential indication a weakened FACR-EP, they do not address the FARC-EP’ 
center of gravity—its support, either voluntary or coerced. In fact, a decrease in 
kidnappings and extortion may actually be indicative of greater campesino support for the 
FARC-EP. As coca protection profits rise, they could afford to scale back their other 
illegal activities, which are more damaging to public opinion. 
A reduction in FARC-EP coerced support might be manifested by increased 
support for the Colombian Government, especially in terms of cooperation with local 
police and military units. As the locals in a given region feel less threatened by the 
FARC-EP, they are more likely to provide intelligence on the FARC-EP. This can be 
directly measured by the number of tips received. The number of valid tips received from 
the local population may be the best way to measure whom the population supports, or at 
least respects the most. 
Those campesions involved in coca cultivation are less likely to provide the 
government intelligence or cooperation, even if they no longer support the FARC-EP. 
Instead, a loss of voluntary support for the FARC-EP will be harder to measure. Over the 
long run, it can be expected to manifest itself in reduced FARC-EP operating capabilities. 
As the FARC-EP does not publish its annual budget, there may be no easy way to 
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measure a decrease in financial support. Captured documents, such as the “FARC Files” 
and defector interviews may offer periodic snapshots, but cannot be relied on for regular 
updates. Only continuous, rigorous net assessment can take into account all of the above 
factors and determine if the desired end state is being achieved. 
2. Counter Narcotics Metrics 
The center of gravity of the narcotics trade is the willingness of the campesinos to 
cultivate coca. Directly measuring this is not possible, as the best metric would be the 
price of coca leaves. However, this cannot be accurately tracked by government forces, as 
few people will openly admit to illegal activity. Tracking prices at other stages in the 
drug trade, while equally as difficult, are less reflective of the supply of coca and more 
reflective of the success of counter-drug operations, such as interdiction. 
If it is not possible to accurately measure the price of coca leaves, other metrics 
must be employed, such as measuring the legal economy of Colombia. If coca cultivators 
were induced to shift production to legal crops, the supply of coca would decrease. This 
shift would manifest itself as an increase in yields of coffee, bananas, corn, and other 
crops. This is not perfect, as increased legal crop yields could be the result of increased 
efficiency, more acres under cultivation, or urban workers migrating to the countryside to 
find work, rather than a shift from illegal to legal cultivation. Additionally, an increase in 
other employment, such as factory workers or service sector workers, could drain labor 
from the countryside, decreasing the amount of campesinos available to cultivate coca. 
The long-term method to reduce the supply of coca is to offer more attractive 
legal employment. This means growing Colombia’s economy in a manner that provides 
for better paying jobs. This can be tracked by measures, such as Gini coefficients, 
exports, and GDP. 
In the short, a reduction in the supply of coca will reduce the amount of money 
the FARC-EP receives, both as there will be less campesinos who need to pay the FARC-
EP for protection, and as an increase in the price of coca leaves will cut into the profit 
margin of those FARC-EP blocks that do engage in cocaine production. This too can be  
 
56 
tracked by captured files and defector interviews. Again, proper net assessment is 
necessary to account for all the variables, make reasonable estimations of impossible to 
determine statistics, and recommend the proper way ahead. 
3. Victory 
It is premature in 2012 to rule the FARC-EP finished. The FARC-EP has been 
active since 1964, and even a 50% reduction in manpower or drug income would leave it 
with a sizeable army and war chest. They are just as capable of conducting net 
assessments as the ENC, and responded to Plan Patriota with Plan Resistencia, which 
called for the FARC-EP to disappear into remote areas or urban barrios. There are vast 
amounts of uninhabited jungle in Colombia, and in theory, the FARC-EP could survive 
with the support of those involved in coca production. 
Despite Plan Resistencia, the FARC-EP suffered badly at the hands of the ENC, 
leading them to Plan Renacer, calling for a shift to an urban guerrilla campaign,90 which 
may have mixed results. Rumors that it plans to launch urban campaigns periodically 
surface in Colombia. However, the FARC-EP is ideologically and historically a rural 
movement whose flirtations with urban campaigns are usually short lived, not the least 
because to abandon their rural enclaves would sever them from their primary source of 
support and income. 
Absent gaining true popular support, the FARC-EP will have to continue to 
finance itself by criminal activities. There is already growing popular dissatisfaction with 
the FARC-EP’s violent acts, as demonstrated by the February 4, 2008 rallies calling for 
the liberation of hundreds of hostages, with participation estimated between hundreds of 
thousands and several million people worldwide.91 Additionally, Venezuela’s President 
Hugo Chavez, a former ally, called for them to disarm and work towards political reforms 
peacefully, although he has failed to back this up by disarming their camps on the 
Colombian/Venezuelan border.  
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Victory in the fight against the FARC-EP is a relative term. The FARC-EP has 
survived for almost fifty years and will likely survive in some form for the foreseeable 
future. However, the FARC-EP does not currently offer a credible threat to the existence 
of the state of Colombia, and it is hard to imagine a realist path for them to replace the 
state in the near future. The Colombian Government must capitalize on its success; and 
continue to improve its governance and its armed forces. To absolutely defeat the FARC-
EP will require immense economic and social change. Even still, as long as there is a 
global market for illegal narcotics, there will be coca cultivation and the associated armed 
groups in the rural areas of Colombia, just as there are marijuana fields in remote regions 
of the United States.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The Colombian Government has made notable progress in its fight against the 
FARC-EP, but it cannot afford to rest on its laurels. Having significantly weakened the 
FARC-EP, it must conduct a fresh net assessment, to determine if the nature of the 
conflict, and the enemy, has remained the same, or if a shift in strategy is necessary. 
Successfully attacking a center of gravity may result in a new center of gravity emerging, 
such as the emergence of the Cali Cartel as the leading Colombian drug cartel following 
the Colombian Government’s successes against the Medellín Cartel. Likewise, a 
successful campaign against the FARC-EP’s drug funding may precipitate an increase in 
kidnappings, roadblocks, or other illegal revenue operations, which may potentially be 
more damaging to Colombian civilian society.  
1. Military Improvements 
Not only should the Colombian government attack the centers of gravities 
identified in this thesis, it should continue to improve the capabilities of its armed forces, 
following the successful counterinsurgency strategy it has implemented. It should 
continue to increase the professionalism of its service members, emphasizing the 
importance of human rights and the rule of law, in order to increase its popular support. 
This will allow it to better identify and isolate guerrillas from the civilian population. It 
should continue to develop small unit leaders, air and riverine mobility, and close air 
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support, so that it can better destroy FARC-EP units once they have been identified. This 
will result in fewer friendly and civilian casualties, increasing troop morale and further 
the improving the legitimacy of the Colombian Armed Forces and thus the Colombian 
State. Increasing the presence, quality, and legitimacy of the Colombian Government will 
help ensure that a potentially defeated FARC-EP is not replaced by another insurgent 
group. Rather, the Colombian state would occupy the space vacated by the FARC-EP. 
2. Economic Improvements 
Few insurgencies can be defeated by a purely military strategy. There are 
underlying social and economic problems in Colombia that have contributed to the 
FARC-EP’s longevity and successes, as evidenced by the degree of popular support they 
enjoy despite the hardships they have inflicted on the citizens of Colombia. Even if the 
Colombian Government were to utterly annihilate the FARC-EP, failure to address the 
root causes of the Colombian insurgencies will only result in future insurgencies. Not 
only should net assessment be used to assess the military dimensions of an insurgency, 
but it should examine all dimensions of the conflict. In the case of Colombia, economic 
inequities, poorly defined land titles, government corruption, and weak local 
governments have contributed as much if not more to the FARC-EP’s cause than guns 
and drugs. 
Significant land reform and economic improvement will satisfy the demands of 
some insurgents and some sympathizers, reducing the FARC-EP’s strength and possibly 
opening up internal schisms. Giving the campesinos clear title to their land will give them 
a stake in society and in the current Colombian Government, making them more resistant 
to insurgent recruitment. Improving the economic conditions of Colombia will offer the 
citizens employment that is more attractive than cultivating coca, whether that is farming 
legitimate crops, manufacturing, or other legal employment. Reducing the relative 
attractiveness of cultivating coca will drive the price of coca leaves up, which will limit 
the FARC-EP’s revenue flow, as well as positively impact the general culture of 
lawlessness prevalent in some areas of Colombia. 
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3. Demilitarization of Government Functions 
The Colombian Government must capitalize on the legitimacy it does enjoy, 
especially in regions where well-trained troops are seen as honest, impartial actors. It is 
not sufficient that the ENC is seen as legitimate; the Colombian Government must 
gradually replace its domestic military presence with civilian agencies. Granted, many 
Latin American countries have a tradition of domestic military operations, where the 
Army is often the only government presence in large portions of the country. Regardless 
of the skill or efficiency of the ENC, relying on it for basic civic functions, such as 
teaching school, is indicative of government weakness. Replacing soldiers with civilians 
not only demonstrates improvements in security and governance; it also frees up soldiers 
to further increase the pressure on remaining FARC-EP fronts.  
4. Ending the Conflict 
As the Colombian Government enjoys increasing success against the FARC-EP, it 
should plan for the endgame, such as the 2012-peace process. Any negotiation requires 
concessions from both sides. The Colombian Government must use net assessment to 
yield on points that will weaken the FARC-EP, and refuse to concede on issues that may 
strengthen the FARC-EP. “Conceding” on land reform issues will actually strengthen the 
Government by addressing one of the principle grievances contributing to the FARC-
EP’s popularity. However, ceding large swaths of territory, such as the Despeje, to 
guerrilla control strengthen the insurgencies and must be avoided. While the Despeje may 
have been a necessary delaying tactic in 1998, the Colombian Government is in a much 
stronger position in 2012, and can afford to dictate terms more favorable to the state. 
The Colombian Government should now move to terminate the decades-long 
struggle with the FARC-EP through both negotiations and continued military pressure. 
Negotiations will demobilize the more moderate FARC-EP members, but there will 
always be a small group of hardcore true believers who will settle for nothing less than 
the destruction and replacement of the Colombian state. These diehards must be dealt 
with kinetically, or so marginalized that they are reduced to isolated fugitives, unable to 
challenge the Colombian Government. As negotiations progress, as more insurgents quit 
the fight, the pressure to demobilize on the remaining guerrillas will increase, due to the 
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bandwagon effect. Additionally, defecting guerrillas will provide the government with 
intelligence, further exposing the remaining cadres to kinetic solutions. Continuous net 
assessment will indicate when this begins to happen, allowing the Colombian 
Government to follow through and ensure a favorable outcome to the FARC-EP-led 
insurgency. 
5. Post FARC-EP 
Destruction of the FARC-EP will not result in the termination of the Colombian 
drug trade. Already, the BACRIMS are assuming a greater share of the drug trade. 
However, some of the strategies necessary to defeat the FARC-EP, such as increasing the 
presence and legitimacy of the Colombian Government, and creating economic 
opportunity for the campesinos are just as necessary and useful in countering the illegal 
narcotics trade. Many of the same metrics that show progress against the FARC-EP can 
be used to track progress against non-political narco-traffickers, such as the willingness 
of the population to cultivate coca. 
6. Continuous Net Assessment 
Reliance on a single metric, or even a single set of metrics, is wrong. Even if the 
metric being used accurately reflects progress in a desired direction, there may be 
unintended consequences, unforeseen second and third order effects that make the 
situation worse. A simple historical example would be the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor—they successfully disabled the American battleship fleet, drastically reducing the 
U.S. Navy’s strength on paper. However, this forced American naval focus to shift to 
aircraft carriers, a technologically superior weapon, as their only remaining capital ships. 
It could be argued that the center of gravity of the U.S. Navy on December 6, 1941, was 
its 15 dreadnought battleships, and by December 8, 1941, its center of gravity had 
become its seven aircraft carriers. Likewise, the Colombian government must be careful 
that, in weakening one aspect of the FARC-EP, it does not unintentionally aid the 
guerrillas, or create space for another illegal organization to flourish. 
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Properly applied net assessment can be vital to victory in the entire range of 
warfare, from counterinsurgency to global state-on-state warfare. Improperly applied net 
assessment, incorrectly identified centers of gravity, and misleading metrics are a recipe 
for possible defeat. U.S. military planners should use a rigorous net assessment procedure 
to determine the nature of potential future conflicts, and measure U.S. plans against 
projected enemy responses to predict expected second and third order effects. However, it 
is not sufficient to apply net assessment ante bellum. Rather, net assessment must be a 
continuous process during all phases of conflict. Additionally, military leaders should be 
ready to change strategies if conclusions so indicate. Changing strategies is not 
necessarily an indication of past failure—it may simply indicate the need to evolve along 
with an evolving enemy. Perhaps the worse failure a military leader can commit is to 
ignore the results of net assessment, and squander time, resources, and lives pursuing the 
wrong strategy. Metrics can be seductive, and the evolving nature of all armed conflict 
means that even the best metrics can lose their relevance or become deceptive as 
campaigns progress. Only continual net assessment allows commanders to maintain an 
accurate view of a conflict, and remain on the path to victory. 
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